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### Plan

#### The United States federal government ought to include the United Mexican States in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

### Contention 1 - Mexican Manufacturing

#### TTIP agreement talks between the US and EU are coming

EC 7/12/13 – (“EU and US conclude first round of TTIP negotiations in Washington”, European Commission, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=941)//javi

The first week-long round of talks for an EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) comes to a closure today in Washington. “It’s been a very productive week”, said EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio Garcia-Bercero coming out of the talks. “We have been striving already for many months to prepare the ground for an ambitious trade and investment deal that will boost the transatlantic economy, delivering jobs and growth for both European and Americans. This week we have been able to take this negotiation to the next step. The main objective has been met: we had a substantive round of talks on the full range of topics that we intend to cover in this agreement. This paves the way to for a good second round of negotiations in Brussels in October.” Working throughout the week, the negotiating groups have set out respective approaches and ambitions in as much as twenty various areas that the TTIP - the biggest bilateral trade and investment negotiation ever undertaken - is set to cover. They included: market access for agricultural and industrial goods, government procurement, investment, energy and raw materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable development, small- and medium-sized enterprises, dispute settlement, competition, customs/trade facilitation, and state-owned enterprises. Negotiators identified certain areas of convergence across various components of the negotiation and - in areas of divergence – begun to explore possibilities to bridge the gaps. The talks have been based on a thorough review of the stakeholders views expressed to date. The negotiators met also in the middle of the week with approximately 350 stakeholders from academia, trade unions, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations to listen to formal presentations and answer questions related to the proposed agreement.

#### US should invite Mexico to EU-US partnership

Siekierski 3/15/13 – (BJ, “Is Mexico looking for NAFTA-EU trade talks?”, iPolitics, <http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/03/15/is-mexico-looking-for-nafta-eu-trade-talks/>)//javi

“It seems really logical to us that this be a trilateral negotiation and that Mexico join,” Minister Guajardo was quoted as saying, in Spanish, by a prominent Mexican business newspaper, El Financiero, Wednesday. Though Mexico already has an agreement with the European Union — which came into force in 2000 — the El Financiero article says Mexican and European authorities have agreed to strengthen it. Rather than negotiate simultaneously with the Americans, therefore, the idea would be to bring both negotiations under one roof. And since Canada is a fellow NAFTA partner, common sense would dictate Canadian involvement as well. With the EU and U.S. aiming to begin their Transatlantic talks in June, Guajardo indicated that Mexico would be “formally petitioning” the EU President and Barack Obama to make it a NAFTA-EU negotiation, El Financiero reported.

#### Mexico needs to be included – expands trade and development of common standards

Negroponte 5/2/13 – Diana Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative under Foreign Policy at Brookings. She focuses on Latin America and researches and writes about the New Left, populism and the relationship between criminal gangs and state institutions. Negroponte is editor of The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global Competition Ph.D., Georgetown University J.D., American University B.S. Econ, London School of Economics & Political Science (Diana Villiers, “Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/02-obama-mexico-trip-trade-investment-negroponte)//javi

Investment flows are also mutually beneficial. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, sales of services in Mexico by majority U.S. owned affiliates were $34.4 billion in 2010. Sales of services in the United States by majority Mexico-owned firms were $4.8 billion. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, the United States currently provides 41 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico, benefiting more than 21,139 companies. Beyond the numbers, the reality of trade and investment is that the United States and Mexico compete together in the global economy. Production and supply chains in North America are deeply integrated with the U.S. content of Mexico exports to the United States estimated at 40 cents on the dollar. This compares to 25 cents for Canadian exports to the United States and 4 cents for China and 2 cents for the European Union, according to a Wilson Center report. In short, there exists a growing integrated manufacturing platform that takes advantage of geography, time zones and cultural affinity. The challenge ahead is how to build on that integration for the forthcoming Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment talks with the European Union. The development of common standards and regulations will impact both Mexican and Canadian industry. Therefore, they need to be either at the table, or close to the negotiations. How close will the consultations with the Mexican trade delegation be? Ideally, the Mexicans would like to be at the negotiating table, but that is improbable. More likely is a commitment from President Obama to consult closely with the Mexican delegation. This could include both pre-talks and post-talk briefings, reinforcing Obama’s call “to maintain the economic dialogue over a long period of time.” On the European side, Turkey wishes to have a close consultative arrangement with the EU negotiators. This creates a balanced need for consultations with immediate trading partners.

#### Trade declines if Mexico is not included

Felbermayr et. al. 13 – (“Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Who benefits from a free trade deal?”, GED, http://www.ged-shorts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Study-TTIP\_final\_ENG.pdf)//javi

Table 7 examines the changes in trade in North America and between the USA and the BRICS. A few important insights are striking. First, TTIP leads to trade diversion effects within the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between USA, Mexico and Canada. In the comprehensive liberalization scenario, both exports and imports decline for NAFTA partner countries within the region. The two NAFTA countries whose position is not improved by TTIP, Mexico and Canada, intensify their trade. That is an impressive example of trade diversion effects between countries not directly affected in anyway by TTIP: The access of these countries especially to the US market becomes less attractive due to increased competition from the EU, leading to a substantial rise in trade between them. What makes this effect so strong is that the trade barriers, as we know, between Mexico and Canada have already been eliminated. Interestingly, TTIP leads to an expansion of trade between the EU and Canada. Geographic circumstances are decisive for this result. Because of its closeness to the USA, Canada is especially affected by trade diversion effects involving the USA. This effect leads to creating trade with the EU countries that are geographically farther away, so that transport costs are lower, and the change in the relative cost structures leads to replacement of the American market with the EU. This circumstance means that finalization of an agreement between the EU and Canada, currently under negotiation, would strengthen the trade of the countries involved with each other but not eliminate the negative trade diversion effects.

#### Exclusion of Mexico hurts trade partnership

BFNA 6/17/13 – (“US, EU Benefit Significantly From TTIP”, Bertelsmann Foundation, http://www.bfna.org/article/us-eu-benefit-significantly-from-ttip)//javi

WASHINGTON, DC/GUETERSLOH, GERMANY (June 17, 2013) - The US and all EU member countries would benefit significantly from a comprehensive trade pact, according to "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal?", an ifo Institute study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation. A TTIP that eliminates non-tariff trade barriers and tariffs would boost per capita GDP and employment on both sides of the Atlantic but impose losses on much of the rest of the world. The US would achieve the greatest growth from a TTIP, with long-term per capita GDP climbing 13.4 percent. EU member states would, on average, see five-percent growth in long-term per capita GDP. The United Kingdom would be Europe’s biggest beneficiary; its long-term per capita GDP would rise 9.7 percent. Other EU member countries that would profit more than average from a far-reaching liberalization of trade include small export-oriented economies, such as those of the Baltic states, and crisis-ridden southern European countries. The large economies of Germany and France would benefit less than the EU average from a comprehensive free-trade agreement. Long-term German per capita GDP would increase 4.7 percent; the comparative French figure is 2.6 percent. Intensified trade relations between the US and the EU would decrease their imports from the rest of the world. As a result, long-term per capital GDP would drop 9.5 percent in Canada and 7.2 percent in Mexico. Japan would also see a fall, of 5.9 percent. Additional losers would include developing countries, especially those in Africa and central Asia.

#### US-Mexico trade key to resolve Mexican instability and manufacturing sector

O’Neill 3/18/13 – (Shannon, “Mexico and the United States are linked closer than ever through trade”, Voxxi, http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-united-states-linked-trade/)//javi

When it comes to Mexico, people usually think about the security issue, and that’s what much of the news coverage has been. But underneath that, behind the headlines, we have seen a transformation of Mexico’s economy over the last couple of decades: It has moved from a very closed, inward-looking economy, one whose exports were dominated by oil, to an economy that is one of the most open and increasingly competitive in the world. In measures like trade to GDP, Mexico outpaces not just the United States or places like Brazil, but it outpaces China. It is quite an open and competitive economy now. A big part of that is due to its deepening ties to the United States. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was signed almost 20 years ago, we have seen the creation of regional supply chains for a myriad of different types of industries and companies. For every product that is imported from Mexico in the US, on average 40 percent of it would actually have been made in the U.S. It has become a very symbiotic relationship, and it has become an integrated economy in many ways and in many sectors, particularly in manufacturing. There, we see almost seamless integration in some companies, where production happens on both sides of the border. What it means is these economies, companies and industries are now not only intimately tied, but permanently tied at this point. Mexico’s positive future tied to the United States Mexico’s positive future is closely tied to the United States, in part because of this integration of production. If it does extend beyond the United States, it would most likely be through an expansion of what is already this North American production platform, through agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would expand Nafta beyond Canada and Mexico, to include other Latin American countries and many Asia Pacific countries. It is quite a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, and one could see it expanding in production chains in many other countries that are participants, and sales would be going up. The U.S., for all of its hiccups in recent years, is still the largest market in the world, so being tied to the U.S. is not a bad thing at all. Recently, talk about a mega-agreement on trade between the world’s biggest trading bloc—the European Union—and the United States has surfaced. But it is not clear at all that this would hurt Mexico; it already has its own trade agreement with the EU and, on the other hand, there may be incentives to extend the EU-U.S. trade agreement to include other countries.

#### US is an integral part of Mexican manufacturing industry

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### US free trade is key to Mexican manufacturing and aerospace

Ryder 10 – (“Mexico Takes Flight”, Inbound Logistics, June 2010, http://www.ryder.com/en/supply-chain/solutions-by-industry/~/media/Ryder/Files/KnowledgeCenter/WhitePapers/RSC345Mexico%20Takes%20FlightIBLLowResEprintsingle.pdf)//javi

Among the many attractions that draw aerospace companies to Mexico, the cost of labor is a major factor. Highly skilled workers in Mexico’s aerospace industry earn from $5.80 to $7.80 an hour. Mexico is the lowest-cost choice for U.S. companies that outsource manufacturing abroad, surpassing India, China, and Vietnam, according to a report released this year by AlixPartners. Companies can easily ship products and components to Mexico from their plants in the United States or Canada for final assembly, or ship finished products to customers throughout North America. “You’re talking hours and days, rather than weeks, for transit to the United States,” says Jim Moore, vice president of sales for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “You can ship on Thursday morning by truck and deliver on Monday.” Having targeted aerospace as a strategic growth industry, the Mexican government is doing its best to make the country an attractive environment for this sector. One of the most important incentives is the maquila system, which has prompted many North American manufacturers, in a variety of industries, to “nearshore” their production in Mexico. Maquilas are factories that operate in free trade zones. Companies import materials and equipment to those locations without paying taxes or duties, then reexport the finished products. Often, the manufactured goods are components that are shipped to factories outside Mexico for final assembly in products such as aircraft, automobiles, and computers. But even outside the maquila zones, parts and materials for use in aerospace manufacturing enjoy special tariff treatment, entering the country duty-free, says Ricardo Alvarez, director of business development for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “Also, the value-added tax (VAT) is refundable after five days of the import process,” he notes. Mexico’s federal and state governments have established a variety of other tax incentives for the aerospace industry. In fact, from 2006 to 2008–a time when Mexico had eliminated incentives for many manufacturing sectors–it retained its incentives for aerospace. These included capital equipment grants, help with infrastructure, real estate grants, and the establishment of an Aerospace Training Center in Querétaro. FEMIA, an association of 48 aerospace manufacturers operating in Mexico, works with the federal and state governments to promote the interests of the industry. One of FEMIA’s goals is to develop a National Strategic Aerospace Plan.

#### Mexican aerospace is key to US aerospace investments

Taylor 13 (Guy, “Aerospace: An Emerging Mexican Industry”, Americas Quarterly, Winter, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/aerospace-emerging-mexican-industry)

What began as an initial push into Mexico by U.S. manufacturers such as General Electric during the years following the 1994 enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement has now emerged as one of the nation’s most vibrant sectors. With 30,000 Mexicans now employed in aerospace factories across 16 of the nation’s 31 states, Mexican government investment in the sector is also growing—most measurably through the establishment of training schools and new university programs aimed at delivering a future crop of homegrown aerospace workers, plant managers and possibly even designers. The nation graduated more engineers per capita than Germany in 2012. While the states of Querétaro and Baja California make up the majority of aerospace production in Mexico, recent developments in Chihuahua City deserve a closer look. Ford Motor Company opened a factory in 1983 and has since built nearly 7 million truck engines. Thirty-six aerospace parts factories have opened in Chihuahua City over the past five years. A recent reporting trip there revealed that the vast majority of the factories are not Mexican-owned—which makes Mexico’s aerospace market unique in the hemisphere. The downside of this is that the country may be used increasingly for its cheap labor by profit-hungry companies from more established markets. But the upside finds Mexico emerging as a new center of globalization. A variety of international companies have recently opened new plants in Chihuahua City: U.S.-based supplier Nordam, which makes everything from airplane windows to cockpit doors; France-based Manior Aerospace, which cuts shiny precision-shaped steel discs that end up on Boeing commercial jets; and Netherlands-based Fokker Technologies.

#### Aerospace decline causes global instability and great power war

Pfaltzgraff 10 – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9

Deterrence Strategy In stark contrast to the bipolar Cold War nuclear setting, today’s security environment includes multiple, independent nuclear actors. Some of these independent nuclear weapons states are potential adversaries, some are rivals, and some are friends, but the initial decision for action by any one of them may lie beyond U.S. control. The United States may need to influence, signal, and restrain enemies, and it may need to continue to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear friends and allies. America may also face catalytic warfare, where, for example, a U.S. ally such as Israel or a third party such as China could initiate action that might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Although the United States would not be a party to the nuclear escalation decision process, it could be drawn into the conflict. Compared to a bipolar world, very little is known about strategic nuclear interaction and escalation in a multipolar world. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must restrain a wider variety of actors today than during the Cold War. This requires a range of capabilities and the capacity to address specific challenges. The deterrent must provide security guarantees and assurance sufficient to prevent the initiation of catalytic warfare by an ally, while deterring an adversary from resorting to nuclear escalation. America may also need simultaneously to deter more than one other nuclear state. Deterrence requirements include four critical elements: early warning, C2, delivery systems, and weapons. The Air Force plays an indispensable role in furnishing the U.S. early warning system in its entirety through satellites and radar networks. In command and control, infrastructure is provided by the Air Force, including Milstar satellites and, in the future, advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) satellites. In the area of delivery systems and weapons, two-thirds of the strategic triad – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers – is furnished by the Air Force and its Global Strike Command. U.S. Overseas Basing and the Anti-Access/Area-Denial Threat The increased availability of anti-access/area-denial assets coupled with growing threats to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace commons are challenging the power projection capabilities of the United States. These threats, in the form of aircraft and long-range missiles carrying conventional or nuclear munitions, present problems for our overseas bases. States such as North Korea, China, and Iran jeopardize the notion that forward-deployed U.S. forces and bases will be safe from enemy attack. Consequently, the United States must create a more flexible basing structure encompassing a passive and active defense posture that includes these features: dispersal, hardening, increased warning time of attack, and air defenses. Simultaneously, the United States must continue to develop long-range, offensive systems such as low-observable manned and remotely piloted strike aircraft, precision missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to penetrate heavily defended A2/AD environments. This approach will increase the survivability of U.S. forward-deployed assets and power projection capabilities and thus bolster deterrence and U.S. guarantees to America’s allies and friends. Asymmetric Challenges The increasing number of actors gaining access to advanced and dual-use technologies augments the potential for asymmetric attacks against the United States and its allies by those who are unable to match U.S. military capabilities. Those actors pose increasing challenges to the ability of the United States to project power through the global commons. Such attacks could target specific U.S. vulnerabilities, ranging from space assets to the financial, transportation, communications, and/or energy infrastructures, and to the food and water supply, to mention only the most obvious. Asymmetric attacks denying access to critical networks and capabilities may be the most cost-effective approach to circumventing traditional U.S. force advantages. The USAF and DoD must develop systems and technologies that can offset and defend against asymmetric capabilities. This will require a robust R&D program and enhanced USAF cooperation with its sister services and international partners and allies. Space Dominance Space is increasingly a contested domain where U.S. dominance is no longer assured given the growing number of actors in space and the potential for kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, including ASAT weapons, EMP, and jamming. As a result, the United States must protect vital space-based platforms and networks by reducing their vulnerability to attack or disruption and increasing the country’s resilience if an attack does occur. Required steps include hardening and incorporating stealth into next generation space systems and developing rapid replenishment capacity (including micro-satellite technologies and systems and new launch capabilities). At the same time, America must reduce its dependence on space capabilities with air-based substitutes such as high altitude, long endurance, and penetrating ISR platforms. Increased cooperation among the services and with U.S. allies to develop such capabilities will also be paramount. Cyber Security Cyber operations are vital to conducting USAF and joint land, sea, air, and space missions. Given the significance of the cyber threat (private, public, and DoD cyber and information networks are routinely under attack), the United States is attempting to construct a layered and robust capability to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions and attacks. The USAF’s cyber operations must be capable of operating in a contested cyber domain to support vital land, sea, air, and space missions. USAF cyberspace priorities include developing capabilities to protect essential military cyber systems and to speed their recovery if an attack does occur; enhancing the Air Force’s capacity to provide USAF personnel with the resolution of technical questions; and training/recruitment of personnel with cyber skills. In addition, the USAF and DoD need to develop technologies that quickly and precisely attribute attacks in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can spread quickly among networks, making it extremely difficult to attribute their perpetrator, and therefore to develop a deterrence strategy based on retaliation. In addition, some cyber issues are in the legal arena, including questions about civil liberties. It is likely that the trend of increased military support to civil authorities (for example, in disaster relief operations) will develop in the cyber arena as well. These efforts will entail greater service, interagency, international, and private-sector collaboration. Organizational Change and Joint Force Operations To address growing national security challenges and increasing fiscal constraints, and to become more effective, the joint force needs to adapt its organizations and processes to the exigencies of the information age and the security setting of the second decade of the twenty-first century. This entails developing a strategy that places increased emphasis on joint operations in which each service acts in greater concert with the others, leverages capacities across the services (two land services, three naval services, and five air services) without duplicating efforts, and encourages interoperability. This would provide combatant commanders (CCDRs) with a greater range of capabilities, allowing heightened flexibility to use force. A good example of this approach is the Air-Sea Battle concept being developed jointly by the Air Force and Navy, which envisions heightened cooperation between the two services and potentially with allies and coalition partners. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities There is an increasing demand for ISR capabilities able to access and persist in contested airspace in order to track a range of high-value mobile and hard-to-find targets, such as missile launchers and underground bunkers. This increases the need for stealthy, survivable systems and the development of next-generation unmanned platforms. The USAF must continue to emphasize precision targeting, both for strike and close-air-support missions. High-fidelity target identification and discrimination enabled by advanced radars and directed-energy systems, including the ability to find, track, and target individuals within a crowd, will provide battlefield commanders with improved options and new opportunities for leveraging joint assets. Engagement and International Security Cooperation Allies and coalition partners bring important capabilities from which the USAF and other services have long benefited. For example, allies and coalition partners can provide enhanced situational awareness and early warning of impending crises as well as assist in understanding the interests, motivations, traditions, and cultures of potential adversaries and prospective coalition partners. Moreover, foreign partner engagement and outreach are an avenue to influence partner and adversary perspectives, thus shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. national security interests. Engagement also may be a key to realizing another Air Force and joint priority: to sustain or gain access to forward operating bases and logistical infrastructure. This is particularly important given the growing availability of A2/AD assets and their ability to impede U.S. power projection capabilities. Procurement Choices and Affordability The USAF needs to field capabilities to support current operations and pressing missions while at the same time pursuing promising technologies to build the force of the future. Affordability, effectiveness, time urgency, and industrial base issues inevitably shape procurement choices and reform. The Air Force must maintain today’s critical assets while also allocating resources to meet future needs. Given the long lifespan anticipated for many weapon systems, planners need to make the most reliable cost estimates and identify problems at the outset of a weapons system’s development phase so that they can be corrected as early and cost-effectively as possible. Support to Civil Authorities As evidenced in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile (the Chile earthquake hit after this conference), the USAF has a vital role to play in the U.S. response to international relief operations and support to civil authorities. In Haiti, the USAF reopened the airport and deployed contingency response elements, while also providing ISR support for the joint forces in the theater. In Chile, USAF satellite communication capabilities were critical to the recovery and relief efforts. USAF civil support roles are likely to grow to include greater use of the Reserve Components. Consequently, USAF planners should reassess the active and reserve component mix of forces and capabilities to identify potential mobilization and requirement shortfalls. CLOSING CONFERENCE THOUGHTS A recurring conference theme was the need for the USAF to continue to examine specific issues of opportunity and vulnerability more closely. For example, a future initiative could include focused working groups that would examine such questions and issues as: • How can air, space, and cyberspace capabilities best support deterrence, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and support national objectives? • How should the USAF leadership reconceptualize its vision, institutional identity, and force posture to align as closely as possible with the future national security setting? • What is the appropriate balance between high-end and low-end air and space capabilities that will maximize military options for national decision makers, given emerging threats and fiscal constraints? • What are the opportunities, options, and tradeoffs for investment and divestment in science and technology, infrastructure, and programmed capabilities? • What are additional interdependent concepts, similar to Air-Sea Battle, that leverage cross-service investments to identify and foster the development of new joint capabilities? • What are alternative approaches to officer accessions and development to support shifting and emerging Air Force missions, operations, and force structure, including cyber warfare? • How can the USAF best interact with Congress to help preserve or refocus the defense-industrial base as well as to minimize mandates and restrictions that weigh on future Air Force investments? Finally, the USAF must continue to be an organization that views debate, as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force put it in his opening conference address, “…as the whetstone upon which we sharpen our strategic thinking.” This debate must also be used in pursuit of political support and to ensure that the USAF maintains and develops critical capabilities to support U.S. national security priorities. The 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy was conceived as a contribution to that debate. Almost a century has passed since the advent of airpower and Billy Mitchell’s demonstration of its operational potential with the sinking of the Ostfriesland on July 21, 1921. For most of that time, the United States has benefitted from the rapid development of air and space power projection capabilities, and, as a result, it has prevailed in successive conflicts, contributed to war deterrence and crisis management, and provided essential humanitarian relief to allies and friends around the world. As we move into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), like its service counterparts, is re-assessing strategies, operational concepts, and force structure. Across the conflict spectrum, security challenges are evolving, and potential adversaries–state and non-state actors–are developing anti-access and other asymmetric capabilities, and irregular warfare challenges are becoming more prevalent. The potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which state adversaries and/or non-state actors use a mix of conventional and unconventional capabilities against the United States, a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emanate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority. As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts constraints that will have important implications for budget and procurement programs, basic research and development (R&D), and the maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the United States and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the United States can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent. General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the United States faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airman who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment. System Versatility In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity. Space Access and Control Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability. Cyber Capabilities The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration. Challenges for the Air Force General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included: • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness? • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century? • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables? • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments? • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations? • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats? • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment? • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges? • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests? These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort. The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions. First, the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats. Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets. Fourth, the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 These threats include ballistic missiles, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations. Fifth, the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so. Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor. Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales. Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive: • A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy • An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists • A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war • A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula

What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management.

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Mexican economic collapse causes instability

**Barnes 11** – (4/29/11, Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, “Oil and U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations,” <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-BarnesBilateral-04292011.pdf>)

There is already a short- to medium-term risk of substantial instability in Mexico.  As noted, the country is enduring extremely high levels of drug-related violence.  Even if the Mexican government eventually succeeds in its efforts to suppress this violence, the process is likely to be expensive, bloody, and corrosive in terms of human rights.  A period of feeble economic growth, combined with a fiscal crisis associated with a drop in revenues from Pemex, could create a “perfect storm” south of the border.   If this were to occur, Washington would have no choice but to respond.  In the longer-term, the United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico.  There is at least one major example of the U.S. coming to Mexico’s aid in an economic emergency.  In 1994, the United States extended US$20 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico when the peso collapsed, in large part to make U.S. creditors whole.  Not least, a healthy Mexican economy would reduce the flow of illegal immigration to the United States.  To the extent that prospects for such growth and sustainability are enhanced by reform of Pemex, the United States should be supportive.  It might be best, in terms of U.S. economic and commercial interests, were Pemex to be fully privatized, but even partial reforms would be welcome.  Not all national oil companies are created equal: Pemex’s development into something like Norway’s Statol would mark an important improvement.

#### Mexican collapse causes the formation of an Latin American – Anti-US alliance

Tobin 06 (Consultant TAO Emergency Management Consulting, “The Coming Civil War in Mexico”, [www.ricktobin.com/papers/thecomingcivilwarinmexico.pdf](http://www.ricktobin.com/papers/thecomingcivilwarinmexico.pdf))

In a fast moving State of War in Mexico, the U.S. government would have to declare neutrality and seal its borders immediately. Within days, the President and Congress would take actions that would be condemned by every country in the world…and of course the U.N. The map on the next page shows the 100-mile buffer zone that would be taken by force by the U.S. military. This would become the new no-man’s zone. Military exchanges would occur between the U.S. and Mexico along the new boundary. After a number of air losses and ground losses, the Mexican government would withdraw and accept the boundary. Every Mexican citizen that remained there would have to carry dual identification at all times. The entire area would be sealed so that traffic of any kind would be highly restricted and monitored. Martial law would be in place with open “shoot-to-kill” orders. At the “old” border, anyone attempting to cross illegally would be shot. The border would be surveilled by the same flying drones now used over Afghanistan and Iraq. They would also be armed with Hellfire missiles. In addition, particularly well-known pathways would be mined and re-mined weekly. In the United States the order would be given to round up all undocumented aliens with Mexican heritage for immediate deportation to the “no-man’s zone.” Those who resisted would be arrested and held in internment camps at abandoned military bases until they could be processed (under the Rex 84 Program and supporting Executive Orders such as 11051 and 11002, etc). A permanent marking would be placed on the hands of those so interned (or a RFID chip). If they were found back in the United States they would face felony imprisonment. An underground railroad would develop to move illegal Mexican aliens to Canada. The U.S. would then demand that if Pemex products were interrupted for even a day, the U.S. would take the oil fields and nationalize them for the U.S. Again, this would raise the threat of intense hostilities, leading to new alliance in the Western Hemisphere. Canada would become a neutral party and no longer support NAFTA or trade with the U.S., including cutting water, electrical and petroleum exports. The Latin American countries might unite as a block and form a powerful alliance with a strong socialist, anti- American focus, led by the triad of Mexico, Cuba, and Venezuela. Later, Brazil would join to make the fourth major power. The United States federal government would now face the existence of threats that included unfriendly border neighbors to the north and south, a declining world position, and internal strife with its own citizens, especially those with Mexican heritage or Latin America links.

#### Global war

Coronel 07 (Petroleum geologist, author and public policy expert, A possible political scenario for Latin America, 2007-2012, http://muevete.wordpress.com/2007/09/18/a-possible-political-scenario-for-latin-america-2007-2012/)

Still, there is no doubt that there are strong efforts being made by some Latin American political leaders to harass the United States. If these efforts intensify and take root, Latin America could become a geopolitical hot spot in the mid-term. The starting point of the anti-U.S. Alliance.Essentially the current threats against U.S. national security originated about nine years ago with the political alliance between Fidel Castro, the Cuban dictator and Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan strongman. This is a symbiotic relationship that has been providing Fidel Castro with money and Hugo Chavez with brains. The strategy chosen by this alliance is based on two facts and one very partial truth. The two facts are: extreme poverty and extreme inequality in the region. The very partial truth is that these two afflictions are the result of U.S. exploitation of the region’s natural resources aided by the systematic political intervention of this country in the internal affairs of the countries of the hemisphere. To blame our own misfortunes and inadequacies on someone else has been an old and proven method to gain adepts and to stir hate and xenophobia among Latin American societies. This is what Fidel Castro has done for the last forty years and this is what he has recommended to Hugo Chavez , a line of action that the Venezuelan strongman has embraced with enthusiasm. **Hugo Chavez’s strategies.** To do this he has been aided by significant amounts of money derived from oil exports. During the last nine years about $220 billion of oil money have entered the Venezuelan national treasury while national debt has tripled to about $65 billion. This amount of money has been mostly spent in three areas: (a), social programs of a temporary nature, really handouts, to the Venezuelan poor; (b), the acquisition of weapons; and (c), subsidies, donations and promises to Latin American countries in order to consolidate political alliances and establish political IOU’s. At least $40 billion have gone into the third category, an amount roughly equivalent to 2-3% of Venezuela’s yearly GDP during the last nine years. As a result of these strategies the Fidel Castro/Hugo Chavez axis has been able to make some progress in its political objectives of eroding the political standing of the United States in the hemisphere and, even, of gaining supporters in the U.S. political scene. By financing the presidential campaigns in several countries they have been able to help Evo Morales, Daniel Ortega and Rafael Correa win the presidencies of Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador. At the same time they saw their favored candidates Ollanta Humala, in Peru, and Andres Lopez Obrador, in Mexico lose close elections while remaining politically strong, especially Lopez Obrador. In parallel Hugo Chavez’s major injection of money into Argentina has helped President Nestor Kirchner to join the anti-U.S. club, a move for which he did not need strong incentives. This is all well known although generally perceived with indifference, sympathy, and tolerance or, even, amusement, in hemispheric political circles. Many celebrate secretly the harassment of such a strong power by smaller, weaker countries. Others are sitting on the political fence, receiving political and material benefits by playing one side against the other. Still others have a weak spot in their ideological hearts for authoritarian regimes and resent the hard sale of democracy being done by the U.S. all over the world. A few even laugh at the colorful antics of President Chavez and have a hard time taking him seriously. However, political harassment of the United States represents just one aspect in a possible wider plan. Later stages might include actual economic aggression and, even, physical action against the northern “empire”. For the time being the main efforts are directed towards the consolidation of the alliance. To do this: • Chavez is providing money to members of the Armed Forces of Bolivia and to city mayors, in order to increase political control over these important Bolivian sectors (2); • Chavez could be funneling money into Argentina to promote the candidacy of Mrs. Cristina Kirchner (3); • The aid given by Chavez to Nicaragua already amounts to about $500 million and, if he follows through in his promise, will include the financing of a $2 billion refinery; • The economic ties of Venezuela and Ecuador are increasing via the oil industry, although President Correa’s ideology already includes a significant component of resentment against the United States. • Chavez is conducting a strategy of alignment with political sectors in the United States that oppose the current government policies. For some of these sectors the desire to erode the current administration has proven greater than their love for democracy. The enemy of their enemy has become their friend (4). Almost all of these strategic initiatives by the Castro/Chavez alliance show an alternative, unfavorable outcome. • Bolivia is in the threshold of a major political crisis, due to the reluctance of important sectors of the country to roll over and play dead to Morales’s pretensions to impose the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly model that ended with the Venezuelan democracy becoming an authoritarian regime. • Mrs. Kirchner, even if she won, as it seems to be the case, might decide to go her separate ways. She has already given some indications that Argentina should not become a simple pawn of Castro/ Chavez in the struggle for hemispheric political leadership. Recent events have convinced her that Chavez’s support probably represents a kiss of death for her political future. • In Ecuador, Correa is already looking at the Bolivian political turmoil with caution, as he does not want to repeat Morales’s errors and realizes that Chavez’s success in Venezuela has been due to his deep pockets rather than his charisma. Correa does not have the money or the charisma of Chavez. • In the United States the individuals and groups that support Chavez are doing so out of personal material or political interest and have been largely rejected by public opinion. It seems improbable that the alliance of these countries, almost entirely based on money and resentment against the United States, could last for long. What if this alliance falters? The main motors of the anti-U. S alliance, Castro and Chavez, understand that this strategy of progressive political harassment of the United States might not succeed. The defeat of Lopez Obrador in Mexico robbed them of a major ally in this strategy. In power Lopez Obrador would have promoted illegal immigration into the U.S. creating numerous points of social and political conflict along the weak U.S.- Mexican border. As it stands today The United States has several ways to weaken Castro/Chavez strategies. In fact, the imminent death of Fidel Castro has practically eliminated much of the brain component of this axis. Hugo Chavez is in need of an alternative plan. The alternative is an alliance with fundamentalist groups or countries that share Hugo Chavez’s resentment against the United States. This explains the approximation of Hugo Chavez to Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Both leaders have an anti-U.S. global alliance as one of their main objectives. Their main weapon is oil or, rather, what they can do to the international oil market, in case they decided to suspend exports of this resource. Some 4 million barrels of oil per day would be out of the supply system, causing a major disruption in the world’s economy. They figure that in such a situation they have less to lose than the United States and its industrialized allies. But oil is not their only weapon. They also have a political weapon to resort to. It has to do with the concerted action of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and FARC, assisted by violent indigenous groups such as those in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador and socially turbulent groups like the illegal immigrants already living in the United States. By promoting the action of these groups against the United States and its Latin American and European allies these groups can do much harm to global political stability. In this scenario one the main promoters of this action would not be located in the Middle East or in the Far East but in Latin America. This would be the first time in history, as far as we can tell, that a Latin American political leader becomes a major threat to world stability.

#### Mexico’s economy is critical to the US – collapse causes decline of US economy and competitiveness

O’Neal ’13 - Shannon K. O’Neil is a senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) a nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, (“Two Nations Indivisible”, it’s a book)

Mexico has come a long way in the last three decades, shifting from a closed to an open economy, from booms and busts to macroeconomic stability, and from a poor to a middle class nation. But it has yet to unlock its true growth potential, or to match the economic gains and growth rates seen in many of its emerging market peers—China, South Korea, Brazil, and Peru. One might sum up U.S. interest as friendly concern for a neighbor, and it is indeed that. But the U.S. economic future is also increasingly tied to Mexico. A real economic partnership between the two neighbors can be more than just an engine for Mexico’s economic middle; it can help protect and expand America’s middle class. The United States’ economic reliance on Mexico is no less real just because it is overlooked. Already twenty-two of the fifty U.S. states claim Mexico as their first or second destination for exports. Leading the pack are the border states. Each month Texan companies send over US$7 billion and their Californian counterparts almost US$2 billion in goods to their neigh bor.82 But this bonanza isn’t limited just to the border. ‘The economies of states such as South Dakota, Nebraska, and New Hampshire now depend on exports to Mexico as well. U.S. companies in industries as diverse as elec tronic equipment, household appliances, paper products, red meat, pears, and grapes rely today on Mexican industry and consumers for their liveli hoods. Because of these ties, economic expansion to the south will boost growth to the north. The opposite is also true; future downturns in Puebla will mean layoffs in Peoria. This dependence through economic integration with Mexico is only deepening as companies worldwide transform the way they make things. American businesses such as Ford, General Electric, Honeywell, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard have rebounded by “near-shoring” or opening fac tories in nearby Mexico. Less recognized, this has saved many U.S. jobs in the process.83 Studies estimate that roughly 40 percent of Mexican-made products value is actually “made in the U.S.A.”—ten times that of Chinese-made goods.84 In this age of inexorable globalization, U.S. eco nomic cooperation with Mexico holds out the hope—and indeed the promise—of stopping the wholesale decampment of manufacturing firms to trans-Pacific locales. Misunderstood by U.S. politicians and pundits alike, NAFTA, and Mexican outsourcing more generally, can he a good thing for U.S. work ers and the U.S. middle class. With a different mindset and approach, U.S.-Mexico economic ties can help boost America’s chances in the global economic race. Using raw data collected confidentially from thousands of large U.S. multinational manufacturing firms, two Harvard Business School professors, along with a colleague from the University of Michigan, upend the conventional wisdom, finding that as companies ramp up investment and employment abroad they also invest and hire more people at home.8 Companies become more productive—and more competitive—and with their better products, lower prices, and higher sales, they create new jobs all around.86 The study shows that, on average, when a firm hires ten employees abroad, it will actually hire, not lay off at least two employees at home. This means that efforts to stop “oftshoring” might actually have the reverse and perverse effect of undermining U.S. jobs.

#### Global economic decline causes nuclear war

Auslin ‘9

(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### Contention 2 - EU Relations

#### Negotiations with Mexico are necessary to the success of TTIP

Knigge 2/26/13 – (Michael, “EU-US trade deal is 'unique opportunity'”, DW, http://www.dw.de/eu-us-trade-deal-is-unique-opportunity/a-16584523?maca=en-rss-en-top-1022-rdf)//javi

Experts are skeptical as to whether such an agreement can ever be reached. They point to similar visions of free, transatlantic trade from the past that fizzled out in the political chambers of Washington and Brussels. After the multi-year and ultimately fruitless worldwide trade deal called the Doha Development Agenda failed in 2008, Washington is also tired of endless discussion. In order to gauge the seriousness of Europeans on the matter, the Obama administration has recently been anxious for a clear signal from Brussels. Yet even if the EU and US begin negotiations in the coming months, success is anything but assured. Negotiators from both the US government and the EU Commission will not be free to negotiate as they please. Without the ultimate approval of US Congress and the EU Parliament, there will be no agreement. Other countries, such as Turkey, which has a customs agreement with the EU, or Canada and Mexico, which are linked to US trade through NAFTA, will at the very least have to play an informal role in future negotiations.

#### EU says yes

COG 3/3/08 – (Bob Thiel, “A Combined EU & North American Trade Block Coming?”, Church of God News, http://www.cogwriter.com/news/prophecy/a-combined-eu-north-american-trade-block-coming/)//javi

Fifty-five U.S. Senators and Congressman currently serve as advisors to a “working group” for the Transatlantic Common Market between the U.S. and the European Union. “An economist from the World Bank has argued in print that the formation of the Transatlantic Common Market is designed to follow the blueprint of Jean Monet, a key intellectual architect of the European Union, recognizing that economic integration must inevitably lead to political integration.” The idea of this union came to light in April 2007, when President Bush, German Chancellor Merkel, and European Commission President Barroso launched the Transatlantic Economic Council. Efforts are already underway to create a North American Community, including the U.S., Mexico and Canada. This community is to be based on security and economic issues and is intended to be in place by 2010 (WorldNetDaily.com, July 20, 2005; September 25, 2006). The Transatlantic Common Market is intended to combine the North American Community with the EU, creating the world’s most formidable trade bloc—a trade bloc that would be so large that its trading policies would automatically become policies for the world. Plans for this new “common market” are proceeding and are intended to pass through in a “treaty” form, much like the most recent EU Treaty, in order to avoid the scrutiny and debate that often come with more “formal” agreements (January 16, 2008). Revelation 18 warns of a future Beast, known as Babylon the Great, through which “the merchants of the earth have become rich through the abundance of her luxury” (v. 3). I have been expecting such a development for some time. And today, I would like to explain what I have believed for over 20 years will most likely happen with the above proposed trade block. Negotiations will continue and some type of loose agreements will happen. In the spirit of accommodation and personal interest, many of the “standards” of the European Union will be adopted by the USA, Canada and Mexico, as well as by nearly all of the countries of the world. The Arab nations will most likely agree with many of the standards as they seem to be destined to form a brief end-time alliance with the Europeans (The Arab World In the Bible, History, and Prophecy).

#### TTIP failure hurts US-EU trade ties and relations

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

Yet even if it fails – and there are plenty who think that the obstacles such as agriculture and, most recently, data privacy are insurmountable – a failure would be pivotal, showing that tariffs can be dropped but non-tariff barriers, which are often more cultural in nature, remain stubborn. A failure, says Fredrik Erixon, the director of the European Center for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels, “could lead to a larger standstill in efforts to address 21st century trade barriers.” Long-standing obstacles Tariffs between the US and EU are already relatively low, but because of the sheer size of trade between the two – representing half of global economic output – advocates say it would be a major booster of growth and jobs, especially in debt-stricken Europe that has seen record high unemployment at 12.2 percent. The two already invest nearly $4 trillion in each other’s economies, according to US statistics, which translates into 7 million jobs. It’s the non-tariff barriers, however, that most are watching in TTIP talks. Today, if a product is made in France, for example, it goes through the various regulatory hurdles to bring it to the marketplace; it then has to go through another set of strenuous – and often redundant – hurdles to reach the US market. Under the TTIP, both sides could agree to mutually recognize the others’ systems. When it comes to car safety, reducing red tape may be an easy compromise. But other issues on the table have long vexed negotiators. That includes French subsidies for its film industry, European resistance to genetically modified foods (GMOs), or data privacy laws – especially in the wake of the information released by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden revealing the US systematically spies on its own citizens, as well as European institutions. “One of the sleeper issues in the deal is how to deal with privacy,” says Bruce Stokes, the director of the Global Economic Attitudes program at the Pew Research Center. Europeans, particularly Germans, are far more sensitive than Americans when it comes to data privacy. “There is a disconnect between Europeans and Americans about this new digital economy,” Mr. Stokes says. And even if the Snowden case is about government, not industry, it bolsters European assumptions that Americans don’t care about privacy, he says. Supporters of the agreement know these talks will be arduous, but at a time of economic weakness, they might have the political will to push forward. “Europe is stuck, and the US is also stuck, although not quite as bad,” says Thomas Wright, a fellow in the Managing Global Order project at the Brookings Institution. “This offers a way that leaders can be proactive and generate growth. I think that resonates with people, particularly in Europe.” Mr. Erixon also says that regulators in specific industries have more of an incentive to find solutions now, because their refusal to compromise would influence every other industry included in the talks. On the issue of the US using chlorine when washing chicken, for example, compromise has been impossible because the context was always too small. “Regulators were trying to defend their position, with no interest at all in participating in negotiations with other countries,” he says. “If you play filibuster now, the cost is higher.” 'Cultural exceptions' – and similarities So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate. “It’s not a little issue. It’s the cultural meat of a nation,” says Josef Braml, transatlantic expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, who has little hope that a deal is attainable – above all, he says, because of the weakness of President Obama. But the “cultural exception” debate could be a harbinger of sentiments that develop as the trade talks get underway. Guillaume Xavier-Bender of the German Marshall Fund of the US in Brussels says that in many ways the talks will show how similar regulations between Europe and the US are. “There are more things in common between Europeans and Americans than there are differences,” he says. But on the politically most sensitive issues, claims that TTIP is merely an American instrument to change European values could be made. “It is possible in Europe you see anti-globalization and anti-liberalization movements evolve into anti-Americanism,” he says. If an agreement becomes impossible to forge, it may ultimately illustrate more than transatlantic differences. Mr. Stokes says that global economies have continuously become more closely integrated over time. But if in the TTIP it’s possible to get rid of tariffs yet not non-tariff barriers, he says it will be telling for the future of trade agreements globally – a sign, he says, that “we may be encountering the edges of the limits of globalization.”

#### Decline in US-EU relations causes Protectionism

C. Fred Bergsten 99, Director, Institute for International Economics, “America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 78 n. 2, March/April 1999, p. 20+, LN.

Both sides now run the risk of drift and even paralysis in transatlantic trade policy -- with potentially severe repercussions for the rest of the world. A slide into protectionism or even a failure to continue opening new markets would have a major impact on the global trading system. Could we then expect Asian economies, who depend on expanded exports to emerge from their deep recessions, to keep their own markets open? Would the transition economies in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia stick to their liberalization strategies? With the backlash against globalization already evident everywhere, the ominous inward-looking protectionist and nationalistic policies that the world has rejected so decisively could reemerge once again. A failure of transatlantic leadership would make such policy reversals particularly likely. The United States and the EU are the only economic superpowers and the only two regions enjoying reasonable economic growth. They created the GATT system and, more recently, the WTO. Despite their own occasional transgressions, they have nurtured and defended the system throughout its evolution over the past 50 years. While Japan has been important on a few issues and the developing countries played an encouraging role in the Uruguay Round, the Atlantic powers built and sustained the world trade order. Their failure to maintain that commitment would devastate the entire regime.

#### Great power war

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### US-EU relations prevent Iran prolif

Peterson et Al. **13** [John Peterson - Chair of International Politics at the University of Edinburgh, Riccardo Alcaro - IAI's Transatlantic Programme, Riccardo Alcaro is co-coordinator of the 7th Framework Programme-funded Transworld project on the future of the transatlantic relationship and its role in the world; he is responsible for the organization of the annual Transatlantic Security Symposium on the security priorities debated by the transatlantic partners. He is a fellow of the EU-wide programme European Foreign and Security Policy Studies, and Nathalie Tocci - Senior Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, “MULTIPOLARITY AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: Multilateralism and Leadership in a New International Order”, P. 15-18, Accessed: 9/17/13]

Above all, the NTA has helped the transatlantic relationship keep pace with the emergence of Brussels as a political capital. The Brussels-Washington “channel” in transatlantic relations has gained in importance in past decades over others, including NATO and the various bilateral channels between Washington and national European capitals (including London and Berlin). US officials or commentators concerned with individual policy sectors or areas of the world are exceptions to the rule about American ignorance of the EU. To illustrate, analysts of the politics of Iran’s nuclear programme concede that “[t]he Europeans have been the unsung heroes in pressing Iran with their embargo on the import of Iranian oil” (Middle East Institute 2012). The embargo caused genuine pain to southern EU member states already in serious economic difficulties. But it also ratcheted up the pressure on Teheran – posing genuine economic hardship on Iran – in a way that made the West seem like a collective. On the economic front, trade specialists and economists regularly acknowledge the importance of the Union both as the world’s largest trading power and by far America’s most important economic partner (see Hamilton and Quinlan 2013). Toje (2008: 144) notes that “American decision-makers do take the European Union very seriously in matters of trade and economy.” An exemplary instance was the 2011 NTA summit that yielded an agreement to create a bilateral High Level Working on Jobs and Growth to tackle an ambitious cooperative economic policy agenda. There is sufficient “low-hanging fruit” in the form of economic gains for both sides to justify an ambitious US-EU economic cooperation agreement. Two separate studies suggested that greater gains for the US were available from a US-EU deal than from the Trans-Pacific Partnership it was pursuing in Asia (see Stokes 2013). Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address featured clear investment of political will in the initiative from the highest political level: “tonight I am announcing that we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union – because trade that is free and fair across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.” Hence, the institutions that bind the West together appear relatively robust. Moreover, new forces in the emerging international order can be interpreted, plausibly, as pushing the US and EU towards each other. One is the rise of China. The Obama administration’s “Asian pivot” signalled a fundamental shift in America’s geopolitical focus towards Asia and away from Europe. Collective transatlantic action on China will inevitably face obstacles as the US and Europe each try to curry favour with China and seek access to its fast-growing markets. But both Washington and European national capitals – not least Brussels – share an interest in encouraging Beijing to settle disputes with other Asian capitals over islands and territory in the region peacefully and, above all, to become a responsible international economic actor. Another change that, on balance, may encourage collective transatlantic action is Russia’s emergence as a “pole.” European reliance on Russian energy supplies makes confrontation a decidedly unappealing option for most EU member states, which are naturally inclined to seek some form of modus vivendi with their difficult neighbour (David et al. 2013). The US has no such concerns and is therefore less restrained in criticizing Moscow for its poor human rights record or signalling that Georgia and Ukraine might become NATO members, as the Bush administration did (recklessly), provoking deep resentment in the Kremlin. Yet, the US has its own interest in engaging Russia in ways that make it a responsible geopolitical player in its near abroad and something like a normal trading power as a WTO member. A perhaps less obvious source of common transatlantic cause is the rise of India. The incentives for the US and Europe jointly to encourage New Delhi to be a help and not a hindrance on all things “AfPak” (Afghanistan and Pakistan) are clear. Only slightly less so is shared motivation to prod India – a country where trade ministers are garlanded when they return home from a WTO summit after scuppering a deal – towards wielding its economic power in ways that are not cynical and self-centred, as well as to develop its way out of its grinding poverty. At the same time, forces exist that strain the West. There is no question that Europe – leaving aside the euro crisis – has slid down the list of American geopolitical priorities. The EU and Europe more generally remain underappreciated allies in Washington. The US Republican party often finds a convenient epithet for Obama’s economic policies by describing them as “European.” Consider Mitt Romney’s contentions that Obama “takes his cues from the Social Democrats of Europe” in turning America into a “European-style welfare state and entitlement society,” or Newt Gingrich’s that the President’s goal was a “European socialist state.” The Eurozone crisis, the intense interpenetration of the US and EU in each other’s economies, and the widespread perception that America’s post-2008 economic recovery was stymied in large part by developments in Europe inevitably led many in Washington to view Europe as more a burden than a strategic partner. A broader question is whether the US and Europe are drifting apart in their views of what constitutes a “good society.” New questions arose during the post-2008 recession about the ability of the American economy to sustain an upwardly mobile middle class amidst rising inequality and stubborn unemployment. With a spiralling, crippling public debt, there was little appetite in either major US party to adopt a more European-style role for the state. Sachs (2012) notes very little difference between Democrats and Republicans in terms of their view of the role of the state: Paul Ryan’s (as Romney’s Vice-Presidential candidate) budgetary proposals called for public budget outlays of 19.7 per cent of GDP in 2016 and 19.5 per cent in 2020. Meanwhile, the Obama administration proposed 19.1 per cent in 2016 and 19.7 per cent in 2020. Total US government revenues (at all levels of government) stand at about 32 per cent of GDP. In the EU, the comparable figure is 44 per cent. Other less tangible but still powerful forces also push towards drift and perhaps even fracture. One is a basic lack of American understanding of how Europe is organized politically. Even thoughtful US scholars such as Kupchan (2012: 153) misinterpret the EU by concluding (for example) that the failure of the Union’s Constitutional Treaty led ‘instead [to] drafting a dramatically scaled-down version known as the Lisbon Treaty’. By any account, Lisbon is mostly identical to the Constitutional Treaty without its constitutional trappings about an EU flag, anthem, and so on. Thinking longer term, it is perhaps more germane to the future of transatlantic relations to think that the real problem will be that European policy – including foreign policy – will become more EU-based in the decades to come while the Union struggles to command legitimacy, attention and understanding in the US. No opinion poll to our knowledge has ever shown that a majority of Americans has even heard of the EU. Meanwhile, recent polling data show that the percentage of Americans who think that Europe is the most important area of the world to the US fell from 50 per cent in 1993 to 37 per cent in 2011. Those judging that Asia was most important rose from 31 per cent to 47 per cent (PEW 2011). Having considered the forces that both push Europe and America together, and those that threaten to pull them apart, we find no conclusive evidence of either partnership or a bipolar West. Yet, on balance, the transition towards a more multipolar order heightens the incentives they confront to make common cause, particular on their bilateral economic agenda but also in managing the rise of emerging powers. We consider below what kind of collective transatlantic action might be possible and to what ends. A leading observer of contemporary IR concedes that the greatest challenge of the next decades is “establishing legitimate authority for concerted international action on behalf of the global community… at a time when old relations of authority are eroding” (Ikenberry 2011: 6). Insofar as a shift towards multipolarity creates a “crisis,” it is one of legitimacy and authority. Ikenberry (2011: 5) resorts to liberal institutionalist logic to insist that it is a crisis “within the old hegemonic organization of liberal order…[it is] not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself. It is a crisis of governance.” Clearly, the commitment of several of the BRIC countries to “deep liberal principles” and, by extension, an international order for which they provide a foundation is questionable. At the same time, the age’s most pressing international problems – nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, economic stagnation, global warming and so on – demand not only collective governance but also leadership to give it political impulse. Whether or not we accept Ikenberry’s account, the West can secure its leadership status in any future international order only if it provides such an impulse. Inevitably, its leadershipcapacity will atrophy if Europe and America seek to lead using traditional means. In a rapidly changing environment, a “status quo leadership” aimed mainly at preserving the existing institutional architecture and distribution of power is politically toxic. Assertive leadership that seeks to impose solutions cooked up in Washington or European capitals – or between them – will prove less effective than participatory and inclusive governance. Solving the “crisis of governance” means providing new opportunities for the involvement of various types and constellations of actors in different policy sectors. What is needed is some form of what Burns (1978), in his classic work, termed “transformational leadership.” As the name implies, transformational leadership seeks transformation, often of institutions or rules. Leadership that seeks reform is a more sophisticated exercise than leadership that seeks to play by accepted rules in the pursuit of long-established goals. It embraces not only norm- and agenda-setting, but also – perhaps above all – coalition- and capacity-building. In practical terms, it must drive and shape, but not dictate, the reform of global governance. How to exert such transformational leadership is complicated. The “smart power” notion that combines hard and soft power (Nye 2008) provides a useful, but vague guiding principle whose implementation may take quite different forms in different policy fields. But its essence is combining the hard power of coercion with the soft power of persuasion. The US and Europe possess different kinds of hard power. America is capable of more coercion while the EU has resources – in the form of trade privileges or aid, but also sanctions – that make collective action (at least) possible even on hard security issues such as Iran. Yet, combining hard power with the power to persuade is extremely taxing for the transatlantic partners. Both must, first, coax collective action out of their highly compartmentalized governmental structures. Second, they must – ideally – combine resources and agree on productive divisions of labour (see Lindstrom 2005). Third, they must make the case for international action to publics whose appetite for international activism is, by recent measures, declining.

#### A nuclear Iran results in instability and results in ineffective deterrence

Kroenig and McNally ’13— Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, “Iranian Nukes and Global Oil,” The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.)djm

But the impact of sanctions on future Iranian production pales in comparison to the other geo-economic implications of nuclear weapons in Iran. A nuclear Iran will likely increase the frequency and scope of geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While policy analysts continue to debate how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, most agree a nuclear-armed Iran would have grave repercussions for the region. In March 2012 President Obama stated that U.S. policy was to prevent—not contain—a nuclear-armed Iran, and he explained why: “The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation.”10 President Obama’s fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Iran’s primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responses—particularly the former. But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of “inverted deterrence” against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.11 As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran would exacerbate current conflicts in the Middle East, and this likely bears jarring consequences for global oil prices. Because of the heightened threat to global oil supply that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose, market participants would certainly add a large “risk premium” to oil prices. Oil prices reflect perceived risk in addition to information on actual events or conditions in the market. Recent history shows that even without nuclear weapons, Iran-related events in the Middle East have affected oil prices on fears they could spark a regional war. Traders bid up oil prices in January 2006 when the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council. In subsequent months, news reports about heated Iranian rhetoric and military exercises helped to drive crude prices up further. The surprise outbreak of the Israel-Hizballah war in 2006, not entirely unrelated to concerns about Iran, triggered a $4 per barrel spike on contagion fears. The Iran risk premium subsided after 2007, but a roughly $10–$15 per barrel (10 percent) risk premium returned in early 2012 after the United States and the European Union put in place unusually tough sanctions and hawkish rhetoric on both sides heated up. A survey of nearly two dozen traders and analysts conducted by the Rapidan Group found that a protracted conventional conflict between the United States and Iran that resulted in a three-week closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $25 per barrel rise in oil prices, despite the use of strategic petroleum reserves.12 Were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk premium would greatly exceed the $4–$15 per barrel (roughly 4–15 percent at current prices) already caused by a non-nuclear Iran.13 We expect a belligerent, nuclear-armed Iran would likely embed a risk premium of at least $20–$30 per barrel and spikes of $30–$100 per barrel in the event of actual conflict. Such price increases would be extremely harmful to economic growth and employment. The challenges a nuclear-armed Iran would pose for the oil market are exacerbated by a prospective diminished U.S. ability to act as guarantor of stability in the Gulf. U.S. military presence and intervention has been critical to resolving past threats or geopolitical crises in the region. It has also calmed oil markets in the past. Examples include escorting oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, the destruction of much of Iran’s surface fleet in response to Iran’s mining the Gulf in 1988 and leading a coalition to repel Saddam Hussein’s short-lived invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Currently, the United States can use and threaten to use force against Iran without fear that Iran will retaliate with nuclear weapons. When Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the past, for example, the United States has announced that it would reopen the Strait if Iran went through with it, confident that the U.S. military could quickly prevail in any conventional conflict with Iran while running very little risk of retaliation. If Iran had nuclear weapons, however, U.S. military options would be constrained by inverted deterrence. U.S. threats to use force to reopen the Strait could be countered by Iranian threats to use devastatingly deadly force against U.S. allies, bases or forces in the region. Such threats might not be entirely credible since the U.S. military would control any imaginable escalation ladder up to and including the nuclear threshold, but it wouldn’t be entirely incredible, either, given the risk of accident or inadvertent nuclear use in a high-stakes crisis. If, further, Iran develops ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States—and the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense estimates this could happen as soon as 2015—Iran could also threaten nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland in retaliation for the use of conventional forces in the region. Any U.S. President would have to think long and hard about using force against Iran if it entailed a risk of nuclear war, even a nuclear war that the United States would win. Most worrisome, an unstable, poly-nuclear Middle East will mean that nuclear weapons will be ever-present factors in most, if not all, future regional conflicts. As President Obama noted in the remarks excerpted above, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states might follow suit. Nuclear weapons in these states would further complicate the nuclear balance in the region and potentially extend the boundaries of any nuclear exchange. Even if Iran’s leaders are less reckless and suicidal than their rhetoric would suggest, international politics, crises and miscalculation do not end when countries acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers still challenge nuclear-armed adversaries. As the early decades of the Cold War remind us, nuclear-armed states do sometimes resort to nuclear brinkmanship that can lead to high-stakes nuclear standoffs. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without suffering a massive nuclear exchange; President Kennedy estimated that the probability of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone was as high as 50 percent.14 The reference to the early days of the Cold War is not merely decorative here. Nearly all of the conditions that helped us avoid nuclear war during the latter half of the Cold War are absent from the Iran-Israel-U.S. nuclear balance. Then, there were only two players, both with secure, second-strike capabilities and strategic depth; relatively long flight times for ballistic missiles between states, enabling all sides to eschew launch-on-warning postures; clear lines of communication between capitals; and more. In a high-stakes nuclear crisis with Iran and its adversaries, there is a real risk that things could spiral out of control and result in nuclear war**.**

## 2ac

### 2ac – eu

**Europe will allow Mexico to come**

**Meacham 7/25**/13 – director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Tania Miranda, intern scholar with the CSIS Americas Program, provided research assistance (Carl, “The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Mexico Wants In—Why Not?”, CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/trans-atlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-mexico-wants-why-not)//javi

Under this broad umbrella, there has been one question increasingly posed by policymakers in the Western Hemisphere and the private sector alike: why isn’t Mexico part of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations?—and the ambassador affirmed Mexico’s firm support for the country’s inclusion. The negotiations for the TTIP, the long awaited free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the European Union (EU), launched two weeks ago. Though the start of the talks were initially marred by intense political tensions caused by the recent revelations of U.S. global espionage operations, both parties decided to move forward, given how much both stand to benefit from the agreement. The agreement aims to remove existing trade barriers on a variety of economic sectors between the EU and the United States in order to promote investment flows, facilitate commerce, and boost economic growth and job creation on both sides of the Atlantic. If the negotiations are successful, the TTIP will be the biggest trade agreement in history, encompassing 40 percent of global output. Yet, while Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), remains among the United States' top three trade partners, and already has an FTA with the European Union to build upon, it remains on the negotiating sidelines. And in recent talks at CSIS, including by the National Security Council’s Latin America head as well as the EU’s manager for the Americas, there does not appear to be much interest in including Mexico in talks that are, admittedly, already complex. But if both the United States and the EU are looking to foster economic growth and employment through trade liberalization, why not transform these EU-U.S. talks into an EU-U.S.-Mexico agreement? Q1: What does the Mexican economy look like today? What free trade agreements does the country already belong to? A1: While much of the focus on Mexico from the United States remains on security and immigration, it is the country's increasing competitiveness and economic liberalization that merit attention. Mexico, Latin America's second largest economy, is currently a member of 12 different FTAs involving 44 other nations, making it among the most open of the world's leading economies. In 2011, a full third of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) was comprised of exports and imports. In contrast, just 15 percent of U.S. GDP was derived from the same. Mexico's extensive network of FTAs includes most of the Western Hemisphere, Israel, and Japan. It also belongs to an economic partnership with the European Union (enacted in 2000) and to NAFTA—the world's largest FTA to date, with a combined GDP of $17 trillion linking 450 million people. Last year, Mexico joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, a high-standard FTA among a number of Pacific Rim countries that remains in the works. It is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the emerging Pacific Alliance, a free trade and integration effort that hopes to become the commercial bridge between the Americas and the Asia Pacific region. Mexico alone is a bigger market for the United States than all the BRIC economies combined, and growing opportunities for trade and investment in the economy solidify this status moving forward. Q2: Why has Mexico been excluded from TTIP negotiations to date? A2: While Mexico's recent economic growth has proven impressive, entering the TTIP would provide a meaningful surge for the Mexican economy, potentially propelling it into the proverbial big leagues. **Mexico's interest in being included in the agreement is no secret**, but both the United States and the European Union have ignored the petition, claiming inopportune political circumstances. The reasoning here is twofold. First, given the years of encouragement that preceded the formal start of EU-U.S. negotiations, neither party wishes to jeopardize what could be the biggest FTA in history by bringing more participants on board--regardless of the value their inclusion adds. Leaders from both the United States and the EU think this would bring a long and burdensome political process that could prove detrimental for the negotiations. And though both have shied away from anything that might complicate the process of reaching an initial agreement, neither has rejected the idea of accepting more members down the road, once the agreement is consolidated. The second argument is more of a corollary to the first. At his talk with the Americas Program last week, Christian Leffler, the EU’s managing director for the Americas, explained that because Mexico already shares FTAs with the United States and the EU, including Mexico in the TTIP can be seen as superfluous—at least for now. Particularly given the drag additional parties could put on negotiations, the benefits of including Mexico, so the argument goes, fail to outweigh the potential costs. Q3: Why should Mexico be included in the ongoing TTIP negotiations? A3: In simplest terms, all three parties stand to gain from including Mexico in the TTIP negotiations. While Mexico does have standing trade agreements with the United States and the European Union, both are seen as outdated. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht called for the modernization of the current Mexico-EU agreement last November, and NAFTA modernization including the energy and telecommunications sectors, both of which were excluded when the agreement entered into force nearly 20 years ago, would greatly advance the political and economic interests of the United States. Mexico's stake in being included the agreement is straightforward. The sheer size of the proposed market, coupled with the added competitiveness **Mexico would lose out** on **should it remain excluded,** together provide a compelling rationale for why TTIP membership is in Mexico's interests. It is important for the United States and the EU to remember that Mexico brings a lot to the negotiating table. First, Europe, in dire need of economic reinvigoration and expanded employment, has much to gain from Mexico's liberalized trade with the rest of the world--and its need for foreign direct investment. Second, the U.S.-Mexican economic interdependence implies that indirectly, the more Mexico enhances its global trade relationships, the better off the United States is as well. Finally, because Mexican supply chains are already closely linked to the rest of Latin America and the Asia Pacific region, both the United States and the European Union stand to gain from increased access to those markets as well, and that access could come by means of Mexico's inclusion in the TTIP, given its membership in both the TPP and the Pacific Alliance. Just as NAFTA transformed the relationship between the United States and Mexico, a TTIP that brought our southern neighbor on board could do the same for transatlantic relations. Given its global commercial links, and growing economy and productivity, it makes more sense than ever to bring in one of our biggest economic partners to the TTIP. Conclusion: Mexico is reemerging as a leading destination for foreign investment given the country's low production costs, proximity to the U.S. market, recent sweeping reforms in key economic sectors (and more expected to come), and emerging economies of scale in high-skilled industries. Engaging in the dynamic free trade opportunities the TTIP offers will spur North American and transatlantic economic cooperation alike--and strengthen all parties' competitiveness globally. True, including Mexico will likely make negotiations more difficult. But if the United States and European Union think a little more boldly, the economic results would speak for themselves.

#### Iran proliferation coming – Rouhani plans on expanding the nuclear weapons program

Kahlili 9/20/13 – (Reza, “VIDEO: Iranian president brags about deceiving the West”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2013/09/20/video-iranian-president-brags-about-deceiving-the-west/?print=1)

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has gone on a charm offensive lately with multiple interviews with American media promising collaboration, but a recent video shows he takes pride in deceiving the West. “Gone is the age of blood feuds,” Rouhani stated in an op-ed in the Washington Post. “World leaders are expected to lead in turning threats into opportunities,” he wrote in the Post Friday. In interviews with ABC and NBC, Rouhani said that Iran will never develop nuclear weapons and that he has the authority to make a deal with the West. “In its nuclear program, this government enters with full power and has complete authority,” Rouhani said. “Under no circumstances would we seek any weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, nor will we ever.” Rouhani, who is one of the most trusted figures of the Islamic regime’s supreme leader, has served the Islamic Republic at the highest levels since the 1979 revolution. He has been the deputy speaker of Parliament, the head of the Executive Committee of the High Council for War Support during the Iran-Iraq War, the deputy to the second-in-command of Iran’s joint chiefs of staff, a member of the Expediency Council, a member of the Assembly of Experts (the body that chooses the supreme leader), a former nuclear negotiator, and, most importantly, the representative of the supreme leader to the Supreme National Security Council since 1989. Despite the recent charm offensive in the American media, a recently revealed video of an interview prior to the June Iranian election shows him bragging how he, in his role as Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, deceived the West during negotiations on Iran’s illicit nuclear program even as Iran expanded its nuclear power. At the same time, Rouhani managed to relieve pressure by the West, especially in convincing the Europeans to avert possible military aggression by the Bush administration.

### 2ac – solvency

#### Will pass –

#### a. skepticism was preliminary – coordination leads to agreement

Erlanger their author 6/12/13 – (Steven, “Conflicting Goals Complicate an Effort to Forge a Trans-Atlantic Trade Deal”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/business/global/to-create-jobs-europe-pushes-for-trade-deal-with-us.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1&)//javi

After initial skepticism from Washington, both sides agreed in March to push for what is known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP. David Cameron, the prime minister of Britain, would like to begin the talks formally at the Group of 8 meeting next Monday and Tuesday, if Paris does not block him over its demand to exclude audiovisual services. Officials say they hope to conclude a deal by November 2014. “Done properly, TTIP is a good thing, but there are deeply entrenched interests on both sides of the Atlantic, and they will always fight harder to keep what they have rather than get something new,” said Douglas J. Elliott, a senior fellow in economics at the Brookings Institution. “There will be small benefits for a lot of people but big losses in certain sectors, and they’ll fight.”

### 2ac – apoc

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (s

ee Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### Apocalyptic imagery is key to genuine resistance

**Schatz 12** (JL, Binghamton U, "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-­‐Of-­‐ The-­‐World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism," The Journal of Ecocriticism: Vol 4, No 2 (2012)

Any **hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse** out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical manner **ignores** how any particular metaphor—apocalyptic or not—**always risks getting co--‐opted**. *It does not excuse inaction*. Clearly hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining environmental practices when one looks at the debates surrounding off--‐shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the halls of Congress. “As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems … will go unsolved … only to fester more ominously into the future. … [E]cological crisis … cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context … of internationalized markets, finance, and communications” (Boggs 774). If it weren’t for people such as Watson connecting things like whaling to the end of the world it wouldn’t get the needed coverage to enter into public discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, “Those who dominate the world exploit their positions to their advantage **by defining how the world is known**. Unless they also face resistance, questioning, and challenge from those who are dominated, **they** certainly **will remain the dominant forces**” (2003: 413). Merely sitting back and theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a **grave injustice** to the gains activists are making on the ground. It also **allows hegemonic institutions to continually define the debate** over the environment by framing out any attempt for significant change, whether it be radical or reformist. Only by jumping on every opportunity for resistance can ecocriticism have the hopes of combatting the current ecological reality. This means we must recognize that **we cannot fully escape the master’s house** since the surrounding environment always shapes any form of resistance. Therefore, **we ought to act even if we may get co--‐opted.** As Foucault himself reminds us, “instead of radial ruptures more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about[.] … And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships. It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power” (96--‐97). Here Foucault “asks us to think about resistance differently, as not anterior to power, but a component of it. If we take seriously these notions on the exercise and circulation of power, then we … open … up the field of possibility to talk about particular kinds of environmentalism” (Rutherford 296). This is not to say that all actions are resistant. Rather, the revolutionary actions that are truly resistant oftentimes appear mundane since it is more about altering the intelligibility that frames discussions around the environment than any specific policy change. Again, this is why people like Watson use one issue as a jumping off point to talk about wider politics of ecological awareness. Campaigns that look to the government or a single policy but for a moment, and then go on to challenge hegemonic interactions with the environment through other tactics, allows us to codify strategic points of resistance in numerous places at once. Again, this does not mean we must agree with every tactic. It does mean that even failed attempts are meaningful. For example, while PETA’s ad campaigns have drawn criticism for comparing factory farms to the Holocaust, and featuring naked women who’d rather go naked than wear fur, their importance extends beyond the ads alone6. By bringing the issues to the forefront they draw upon known metaphors and reframe the way people talk about animals despite their potentially anti--‐Semitic and misogynist underpinnings. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s theorization of the multitude serves as an excellent illustration of how **utilizing the power of the master’s biopolitical tools can** become powerful enough to **deconstruct** its house **despite the risk of co--‐optation or backlash**. For them, the multitude is defined by the growing global force of people around the world who are linked together by their common struggles without being formally organized in a hierarchal way. While Hardt and Negri mostly talk about the multitude in relation to global capitalism, their understanding of the commons and analysis of resistance is useful for any ecocritic. They explain, [T]he multitude has matured to such an extent that it is becoming able, through its networks of communication and cooperation … [and] its production of the common, to sustain an alternative democratic society on its own. … Revolutionary politics must grasp, in the movement of the multitudes and through the accumulation of common and cooperative decisions, the moment of rupture … that can create a new world. In the face of the destructive state of exception of biopower, then, there is also a constituent state of exception of democratic biopolitics[,] … creating … a new constitutive temporality. (357) Once one understands the world as interconnected—instead of constructed by different nation--‐states and single environments—conditions in one area of the globe couldn’t be conceptually severed from any other. In short, we’d all have a stake in the global commons. Ecocritics can then **utilize biopolitics** to shape discourse and fight against governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new future for there to be any future. Influencing other people through argument and end--‐of--‐the--‐world tactics is not the same biopower of the state so long as it doesn’t singularize itself but for temporary moments. Therefore, “it is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and communication among singularities … will destroy its [very] possibility” (Hardt & Negri 347). In The context of capitalism, when wealth fails to trickle down it would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably distribute wealth. In the context of environmentalism, not--‐in--‐my--‐backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction elsewhere would be exposed for the failure that it is. There is no backyard that is not one’s own. Ultimately, **images of planetary doom** demonstrate how we are all **interconnected** and in doing so inaugurate a **new world** where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet.

#### Things are getting better now because of hegemony—intensity and number of wars are at the lowest in history

Drezner 5—Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel, “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation”, Blog @ Danieldrezner.com, 5/25, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html>

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

#### Engaging nuclear policy-makers is critical to shape policy and prevent dominance of worse analysis

**Nye 08** (Political Psychology Volume 29, Issue 4, Pages 593-603 Published Online: 8 Jul 2008 Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1 1 Harvard University Copyright © 2008 International Society of Political Psychology

Some academics criticize this narrow professional orientation and engage in politics or policy advocacy, but they argue that the role of academics and universities is to use their independence to criticize the power structure, not support it. Whether through political activism or through the development of "post-positivist" critical theory, they believe that theorists should criticize the powerful, **no matter how little relevance their theory appears to have in the eyes of policy makers** or how little it conforms to the central professional standards of the discipline. There is much to be said for the view that universities are unique institutions, but the imagined trade-off between corruption and relevance need not be so acute. An intermediate position on the appropriateness issue is what I call the "balanced portfolio" approach. When I served as dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, I tried to maintain a faculty on which some members had government experience while others were purely academic. The latter ensured rigor and the former brought relevance, and the combination meant that the institution filled a different role on the research spectrum than either a Washington think tank or a typical academic department. But the portfolio analogy works best when there are a number of people who have occupied both positions in the division of labor at different times and are able to act as bridges. As the above cited evidence suggests, however, "in and outers" who contribute to both practice and theory are increasingly rare. The key to the success of such a faculty mix is the ability and willingness of members to interact and communicate with each other. This is easier in a professional school than in a purely academic department. But even in the latter case, theorists and practice-oriented scholars can communicate if they are interested in policy problems. The communication gap does not belong solely to international relations or foreign policy. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. As journal editor Lee Sigelman observed, "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have know it from leafing through its leading journal" (2006, pp. 463–478). Bruce Jentleson has summarized this middle position, "it is not that all intellectuals must do stints in government, or even make policy relevance a priority for their research and scholarship. But the reverse is too true: as a discipline we place too little value on these kinds of hands-on experiences and this kind of scholarship, to our own detriment as scholars and teachers—and as a discipline" (2002, p. 130). If the gap becomes too large, something is lost for both sides. In the past, academics have made useful contributions to policy, either directly or at arms length. A few decades ago, academics like Arnold Wolfers, Carl Friedrich, McGeorge Bundy, Thomas Schelling, and others felt it proper to be engaged with the policy process. Some academic ideas have been quite significant in framing policy. Through a combination of writing and consulting, Schelling, Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, William Kaufmann, and others **developed and refined theories of nuclear strategy and arms control that were widely used by practitioners in the Cold War.** (In Bridging the Gap, Alex cites the impact of Brodie, Kauffmann, and Herman Kahn.) More recently, Michael Doyle, Rudolph Rummel, Bruce Russett, and others helped to update Kant's theory of the democratic peace ("liberal democracies tend not to fight each other"), and it has entered into popular political discourse and policy (Siverson, 2000, pp. 59–64). In addition to such large ideas, academics have provided many middle-level theories and generalizations that are based upon specific functional or regional knowledge and have proved useful to policy makers (Lieberthal, 2006, pp. 7–15). **Theories about deterrence, balance of terror, interdependence, and bipolarity have helped shape the vocabulary that policy makers depend upon.** As Alex put it, "scholars also perform a useful, indeed a necessary, task by developing better concepts and conceptual frameworks, which should assist policymakers in orienting themselves to the phenomena and the problems with which they must deal" (George, 1993, p. xxiv). Historical analogies are a frequent form of ideas used by policy makers, often in a crude and misleading way. Academics can help to discipline the use and misuse of such analogies (Neustadt & May, 1986, pp. 34–58). Academics can also help the public and policy makers by framing, mapping, and raising questions even when they do not provide answers. As Ernest J. Wilson III argues, "by mapping I mean the identification and explication of the defining dimensions of a new problem, its constituent elements, and its general contours and boundaries" (Wilson, 2000, p. 122). Framing a question is often as important to policy as providing answers. At the end of the Cold War, two of the most influential "mapping" ideas—Francis Fukuyama's idea that class based ideologically driven history had come to an end, and Samuel Huntington's idea of clashes based on cultures and civilizations—were examples of influential academic ideas. From a normative perspective, this record can be used to bolster the argument that academics, as citizens, have an obligation to help to improve policy ideas when they can. Moreover, such engagement in the policy debates can enhance and enrich academic work, and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generation. As Ambassador David D. Newsom has written, "the growingwithdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theoryand modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not **raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events**. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution" (1995–96, p. 52). Alternatively, one can argue that while the gap between theory and policy has grown in recent decades and may have costs for policy, the growing gap has produced better political theory, and that is more important than whether it is relevant. To some extent the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But there are costs as well as benefits. Lepgold and Nincic summarize the trade-offs, "the Ivory Tower exists for a good reason: we expect university-based intellectuals to reflect on the world at some distance, and not simply to do the work of policy commentators or journalists at a slower pace. **But. .** . . it is odd to think that no practical implications should follow from a better understanding of the world. I**f scholars address important, real-world issues, they will more often than not improve their own work and have more to share with those who must act**" (2002, p. 185). Or as Robert Putnam has put it, "simple questions about major real-world events have driven great research. Worrying about the same 'big' issues as our fellow citizens is not a distraction from our best professional work, but often a goad to it" (2003, pp. 313–314). Regardless of one's normative views about the correct relationship of academia to policy, the fields of international relations and foreign policy are not nearly so distant from the influences of the practical world as some scholars like to think. The gap is bridged all too easily in that direction. To paraphrase Keynes, academic theorists, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any practical influence, are usually slaves of unseen larger world events. At times, academic trends and fads have proven to be too influenced by events. Theoretical trends in the field have always been strongly influenced by the outside world. Naturally, if our purpose is to understand the world, current change will drive changes in theory building, but often the swings in academic fashion are excessive and lack balance. That a gap exists between academia and the policy world is both natural and a good thing up to a point, assuming that some efforts are made to bridge it. The academic ethic is to offer elegant theoretical answers to general questions while the policy maker seeks definite answers to particular questions. But in recent years, the gap has been widening and bridging efforts have become more difficult. The growing specialization of knowledge, the increasing scientific methodological orientation of academic disciplines, and development of new institutional transmission belts helps to account for the change. Some aspects of the gap, however, are not new. The world of the academic theorist and the world of the policy practitioner have always involved very different cultures. As an academic going into a policy position at the State Department three decades ago, I was struck by the fact that bureaucracy is a huge machine for turning out reams of paper, but the top policy world is really an oral culture. As I wrote of that experience, "the pace did not permit wide reading or detailed contemplation. I was often bemused by colleagues who sent me thirty or forty-page articles they thought would be helpful. It was all I could do to get through the parts of the intelligence briefings and government papers that my various special assistants underlined for the hour of two of reading possible on a good day" (Nye, 1989, p. 206). As a result, effective policy memos are often one or two pages long, and concise oral briefings are often more influential than memos. As Ezra Vogel reports from his experience as an academic in government in the 1990s, "generally speaking . . . academic books and articles are useless for policymakers. Even if they were not filled with what policymakers consider arcane theories and esoteric details written solely for other academics, these publications are simply too lengthy for policymakers to go through the haystack looking for the needle they might use" (2006, p. 33). A premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures. For the academic, time is a secondary consideration, while accuracy and elegance are primary. As Alex George noted, "Academics aim at increasing general knowledge and wisdom about international relations; practitioners are more interested in the type of knowledge that increases their ability to influence and control the course of events." They want short quick answers while for many academics such short answers are not answers (1993, p. 9). For practitioners, timing is everything. A "B" quality memo written to brief the president for his meeting with a foreign dignitary at 3 pm is a success, while an "A" memo that arrives at 4 pm is a total failure. In the university, the priorities are (properly) reversed. Another difference is the importance of group work as opposed to individual creativity. In the university, plagiarism is a cardinal sin. In government policy work, ideas are a public good and it is often most effective not to attribute credit. Finally, in the academy, the highest value is to ignore politics and speak truth to power, while in the policy world some political trimming and appreciation of "applied truth" may be essential for effectiveness. It is not always easy to straddle these two cultures. I used fiction to dramatize some of the moral dilemmas that arise in The Power Game: A Washington Novel. But the inherent culture gap has grown wider in recent years largely because of trends in academic disciplines and in the institutions of foreign policy. As Stephen Walt explains, the incentive structures and professional ethos of the academic world have changed, and the trickle-down model linking theory and policy has weakened as a transmission belt. In his view, "the prevailing norms of academic life have increasingly discouraged scholars from doing work that would be directly relevant to policy makers" (2005, pp. 26–38). General theories such as structural realism and liberal institutionalism have become more abstract, and some rational choice models, while stimulating to theorists, often reflect what Stanley Hoffmann has called "economics envy" (2006, p. 4). Middle-range generalizations, historical cases, and regional expertise—the types of theory most accessible and most useful to practice—are accorded less prestige in the disciplinary pecking order. Methodology reinforces the trend. As Bruce Jentleson argues, "dominant approaches to methodology give short shrift to policy analysis, to the analytic skills for addressing questions of strategy and for assessing policy options. It is one thing to train Ph.D.s primarily for academic careers; it is another to have this be virtually the only purpose of most major international relations/political science Ph.D. programs. The job market for new Ph.D.s operationalizes this incentive structure" (2002, p. 178). Professors spend most of their energies reproducing little professors. The problem is further compounded by the use of academic jargon and the lack of interest in communicating in plain language to a policy public. As Alex George put it, "not a few policy specialists exposed to the scholarly literature have concluded that most university professors seem to write largely for one another and have little inclination or ability to communicate their knowledge in terms comprehensible to policy makers" (1993, p. 7). Young scholars are rated and promoted by their contributions to refereed academic journals and citations by other scholars in those same journals where there is little premium on writing in clear and accessible English. They get little credit for contributions to policy journals edited for a broader audience. In institutional terms, the transmission belts between academia and government have also changed. Universities are less dominant sources of policy ideas than in the past. In the traditional model, professors produced theories that would trickle down (or out) to the policy world through the articles they wrote and the students they taught. As Walt describes it, "the trickle-down model assumes that new ideas emerge from academic 'ivory towers' (i.e., as abstract theory), gradually filter down into the work of applied analysts (and especially people working in public policy 'think tanks'), and finally reach the perceptions and actions of policy makers. In practice, however, the process by which ideas come to shape policy is far more idiosyncratic and haphazard" (2005, p. 40). Or as Jentleson writes, "whereas thirty or forty years ago academics were the main if not sole cohort of experts on international affairs outside of government and international institutions, today's world is a more competitive marketplace of ideas and expertise" (2002, p. 181). Even when academics supplement the trickle down approach with articles in policy journals, op-eds in newspapers, blogs, consulting for candidates or officials, and appearance in the media, they find many more competitors for attention. Some of these transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. There are more than 1,200 think tanks in the United States alone, and they are very heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology, and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. The think tanks provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moments notice (Haass, 2002, pp. 5–8). In addition, journalists, public intellectuals, nongovernmental organizations, trade associations, private contractors, and others are involved in providing policy ideas. As Ernest Wilson points out, while the pluralism of institutional pathways may be good for democracy, **many of the nonuniversity institutions have narrow interests and tailor their policy advice to fit particular agendas (2007, pp. 147–151). The policy process in democracies is diminished by the withdrawal of an academic community which has broader agendas and more rigorous intellectual standards.**

### 2ac – PEMEX reform

#### Link is non-unique – Nieto is asking to join

Moody 3/13/13 – (Glyn, “Mexico Will Ask To Join US-EU Transatlantic Trade Agreement”, Tech Dirt, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130313/10181122311/mexico-will-ask-to-join-us-eu-transatlantic-trade-agreement.shtml)//javi

Things are moving fast with the proposed US-EU transatlantic free trade agreement (TAFTA). It was only a few weeks ago that the formal announcement was made, and already another country wants to join, as pointed out by @PostActa (original in Spanish): The Mexican government wants to be part of the negotiations of the Transatlantic Association of Trade and Investment (TTIP, in its English acronym), which the United States and European Union will be negotiating, with the idea that there will be two blocks that make up the future pact. That is, alongside the EU block of 27 countries, Mexico is suggesting there should be a similar regional grouping in North America. Interestingly, the story says that the Mexican government will ask the US President for permission to join, with no mention of asking the EU: "It is a sovereign decision of Washington as to the approach and the negotiation strategy to be adopted", and although the U.S. government has already referred to the idea, it is something that is not yet included in a formal dialogue, and needs to be defined. That suggests that the US is actively involved in this latest move -- maybe even its instigator -- and would look favorably on Mexico joining TAFTA. There's also a hint in the article quoted above that Canada too might join TAFTA. Having both Mexico and Canada on board would be consistent with the US's past approach, where it allowed them to join the TPP negotiations, but on fairly humiliating terms that limit their scope of action.

#### Nieto doesn’t have political capital and scandals thump it

Ackerman 2013

John M., professor at the Institute for Legal Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico and a visiting scholar at American University, “The Mexico Bubble,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/01/the\_mexico\_bubble\_enrique\_pena\_nieto?wpisrc=obnetwork

According to the hype, Peña Nieto has already transformed the political landscape in Mexico after only four months in office. Time magazine has named him one of its "100 Most Influential People in the World," claiming that he "combines Reagan's charisma with Obama's intellect and Clinton's political skills." The Financial Times raves that with the death of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Peña Nieto may now take up the torch of Latin American leadership and revive the "Washington Consensus" that predominated in the region during the 1980s and called for drastic restrictions in social spending and the implementation of "trickle-down" neoliberal economic policies. The Washington Post editorial board suggests that "Washington should be cheering Mexico's gridlock busting -- and taking it as an example." Meanwhile, Thomas Friedman, of the New York Times, has called Mexico the "Comeback Kid" and Shannon O´Neil argues in Foreign Affairs that Mexico has now "made it." Such exaggerations have no basis in reality. Even after months of an expensive, high-profile media blitz, Peña Nieto has begun his administration with the lowest public approval rating of any Mexican president over the last two decades. Only 50 percent of Mexicans approve of his presidency today, much less than the 70 percent who supported the first non-PRI president, Vicente Fox, at the beginning of his term, according to Reforma newspaper. Peña Nieto's approval rating is even lower than that for presidents Ernesto Zedillo and Felipe Calderón at the disastrous crisis-ridden beginnings of their terms, according to the same source. A recent poll also shows increased public skepticism in Peña Nieto's, "Pact for Mexico," Today, only 21 percent of the population believes that this pact will benefit them while 31 percent are convinced that it will harm them. This same independent poll reveals that the majority of the population perceives the agreement to be in the interests principally of the political parties and big business. Only 35 percent think that the country as a whole will benefit. It is important to remember that Peña Nieto only received 38.2 percent of the vote in the 2012 presidential elections and that the voting base of his party (Party of the Institutional Revolution-PRI) is principally located in the poorest, least educated, and most isolated rural sectors of the population. All of the most "modern" and "middle class" sectors of the population voted overwhelmingly against bringing the PRI and its pretty-boy candidate back to power, according to independent exit polls and demographic surveys. For instance, the only time Peña Nieto dared to hold a campaign event with college students during last year's presidential race, he was aggressively run off the campus amid shouts that he was an "assassin" and a "thief." Peña Nieto's strategy has been to compensate for this weakness in public support by co-opting the old political opposition and turning his back on his critics in society. But this approach has recently come up against a brick wall. For instance, in their haste to demonstrate quick legislative results, the politicians forgot to consult with civil society before pushing through a controversial education reform at lightning speed last December. As a result, today thousands of teachers are on strike throughout Mexico's poorest southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacán in protest against a reform which they correctly claim threatens to drastically reduce job security, introduce excessive standardized testing, entrench inequality between schools in wealthy and poor areas, and privatize public education. In the state of Guerrero, local citizen militias, parents, and youth groups have even joined with the teachers in a broad-based coalition against Peña Nieto's broader neoliberal economic agenda. Indeed, the Pact for Mexico itself may soon entirely break apart. A new scandal involving the use of Peña Nieto's federal social programs to purchase votes has led the two leading opposition parties, PAN from the right and PRD from the left, to threaten abandoning the pact altogether unless the president takes action against his own top officials. This will be an important test of political will for Peña Nieto to see whether he is able to prioritize accountability over political expediency.

#### Teachers union protests hurt political capital

Montes 2013

Juan, “Strikes by Mexican Teachers Challenge New President,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323551004578438882863242710.html

Last week, tens of thousands of teachers, some armed with metal bars and Molotov cocktails, marched in Guerrero's capital, Chilpancingo. They again blocked for hours the highway that connects Mexico City with the Pacific port of Acapulco, hurting a key economic and tourist hub. The demonstrations have been held sporadically since the overhaul bill was signed.

A protracted conflict could undermine Mr. Peña Nieto's political capital as he is seeking wide consensus for his ambitious agenda, which he put into action with the education-revamp bill just after taking office on Dec. 1. It would also raise doubts over whether the education overhaul will be fully implemented, analysts say. Government officials say the protests won't stop the changes from proceeding.

####  ( ) No link – plan popular in Mexico

Taylor, ’12 – Washington Times correspondant

[Guy Taylor, the Washington Times State Department correspondent, whose work was supported by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting and the Fund For Investigative Journalism, Charismatic front-runner in Mexican presidential race vows shift on drugs, trade, 4/17/12, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/17/trade-top-priority-for-mexican-front-runner/]

The front-runner in Mexico’s presidential race has attracted throngs of supporters among elite and ordinary citizens alike with his calls to boost his country’s trade relationships with Canada and the U.S. — a refocusing effort his staffers call “NAFTA 2.0” — and to tamp down the drug violence that has muddied Mexico’s reputation. **For** Enrique Pena **Nieto** of the Institutional Revolutionary Party — **and** apparently **the majority of the Mexican electorate** — **the economic ties that bind the U.S. and Mexico “need to grow.”** “If we take into consideration what’s happening in the world and the way that competition among countries today is being built by blocs, I believe **we have a great opportunity to make a very strong bloc in North America**,” he said in an exclusive interview with The Washington Times. “I will work on building infrastructure that can make the whole region of North America more competitive.” His message may sound unusual, if not naive, in a country where the news is dominated by reports about drug gangs, corrupt cops and the deaths of nearly 50,000 people in drug-related violence during recent years. But **he is bent on shifting the narrative** away from the illicit drug trade and **toward a collective realization of the potential** for growth in the legal economic **flow between Mexico and the U.S. — a message that resonates among rank-and-file voters seeking jobs and business owners seeking new markets.** A centrist politician with boyish good looks and charm, Mr. Pena Nieto has built a big lead in the polls ahead of the July 1 election. If he wins, which many here say is inevitable, his plan is to channel that charm toward the United States. “We have an opportunity to go further in our relationship with the United States and Canada, but especially with the United States,” he said.

### 2ac – canada cp

#### Perm: do the plan and invite Canada

Moody 3/13/13 – (Glyn, “Mexico Will Ask To Join US-EU Transatlantic Trade Agreement”, Tech Dirt, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130313/10181122311/mexico-will-ask-to-join-us-eu-transatlantic-trade-agreement.shtml)//javi

That suggests that the US is actively involved in this latest move -- maybe even its instigator -- and would look favorably on Mexico joining TAFTA. There's also a hint in the article quoted above that Canada too might join TAFTA. Having both Mexico and Canada on board would be consistent with the US's past approach, where it allowed them to join the TPP negotiations, but on fairly humiliating terms that limit their scope of action.

#### Mexico only wants to join as a response to the Canada EU deal

Trew 3/18/13 – trade campaigner for the Council of Canadians (Stuart, “With French PM in town, Canada commits to EU trade deal 'this year'”, Rabble, http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/council-canadians/2013/03/french-pm-town-canada-commits-eu-trade-deal-year)//javi

So when should we expect a Canada-EU trade deal to be ready? At some point this year seems to be the closest guess, though one frequent CETA commentator wonders if even that is possible. Meanwhile the Mexican government appears to have requested participation in the fledgling U.S.-EU negotiations toward a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), with hints that Canada could also be welcomed aboard by the Obama administration.

#### TTIP checks China rise – bilateralism

Laidi 7/23/13 – (Zaki, “EU takes a bad trade gamble against US”, China Daily, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-07/23/content_16814600.htm>)//javi

Over the past half century, the EU, which represents only 7 percent of the global population, has managed to maintain an exceptionally strong trade position, despite the rise of emerging markets like China. So, while the US and Japan have seen their respective shares of global exports fall, the EU's share has remained stable, at around 20 percent. Indeed, EU trade power contrasts sharply with the perception of a weakened Europe. Most important, Europe was able to achieve it only by investing heavily in a multilateral trade system through the GATT and then the World Trade Organization. And yet, while the EU owes much to the multilateral trade system, since 2006, it, too, has shifted to bilateralism, scoring its biggest successes with free-trade agreements with Latin America and South Korea. An agreement with Canada is now within reach (though bilateral negotiations with India seem to have stalled, probably because the Indians do not believe that a free trade agreement would help them much). Officially, the EU considers a bilateral approach to trade to be perfectly compatible with a return to multilateralism. But the facts belie this. First, it is clear that bilateralism is growing as multilateralism wanes. Since 2008, when the WTO's Doha Round of global free-trade talks collapsed, the Europeans have proved unable to bring the US, China and India back to the multilateral negotiating table. More important, they evidently have given up trying. This is reflected in the EU's reluctance to press emerging countries to become parties to the WTO's multilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, as if it has accepted that this issue can be resolved only bilaterally. Moreover, since 2008, US trade policy has deliberately abandoned multilateralism in order to pursue containment of China via a two-pronged strategy: the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the TTIP. The reason for this change is simple: The US no longer has the power to set the rules of the global trade system, but it considers itself strong enough to work around them. The EU partly shares America's strategic objective here, because it, too, has grievances against emerging powers in terms of market access, compliance with intellectual property rights, access to government procurement and subsidies to state companies. But Europe must avoid alignment with this new and narrow US trade focus for several reasons.

#### Unchecked Chinese rise risks global nuclear war

C. Dale Walton 7, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

### 2ac – politics

#### Won’t solve – current negotiations send conflicting signals and won’t allow new immigrants

-Republican signal

-Future questions

Berg 13

[Kirsten, research associate with the Bernard L. Schwartz Fellows Program at the New America Foundation, “Immigration Frustration,” New America Foundation, 3/22, <http://inthetank.newamerica.net/blog/2013/03/immigration-frustration>]

Tamar Jacoby is not as optimistic about immigration reform as you might think.¶ Even as momentum seems to be swinging strongly towards a breakthrough — bipartisan groups of legislators hammering away at deals, with Republican in a frenzy to appeal to a growing Latino electorate—the reform advocate warns that the partisan divide is larger than it looks.¶ What’s more, she explained during a pizza policy lunch with staff at New America, is that the negotiations are focusing too much on the 11 million already in this country and not enough on the more significant issue: the immigrants to come.¶ Jacoby, a 2013 Schwartz Fellow, has been advising lawmakers through the latest round of negotiations as the CEO of ImmigrationWorks USA, a national coalition of business owners pushing for comprehensive immigration reform.¶ The centerpiece of the current immigration-related negotiations appears to be the question of how to deal with immigrants that are already here. With both parties promoting visions for a route to legalization for those living illegally in the U.S., it may seem as if Congress will finally be able to reach an agreement on something. But if you listen closely, Jacoby says, their paths diverge in significant ways. ¶ Roughly along party lines (with notable exceptions) Democrats have been advocating for a “path to citizenship” while Republicans have been pushing for a “path to legal status.” The difference isn’t as pronounced as the last time the last time Congress took on comprehensive immigration reform in 2007, when the debate came down to whether they should be given legal status at all.¶ (New America’s Andrés Martinez and Jacoby had a great discussion about what has changed—and what has not changed—since the last time immigration reform seemed inevitable in 2007. You can watch that here)¶ But it isn’t trivial. It’s the difference between whether millions will get a chance to become full citizens of the United States, or whether millions will be given a chance for legal residency only. ¶ The Gang of Eight in the Senate look to be leaning toward a path to citizenship, and even Tea Party-favorite Rand Paul recently seemed to endorse the idea that undocumented immigrants should be granted work visas that would allow them to apply for green cards and, eventually, citizenship. ¶ Then again, Jacoby says, it’s not hard to imagine a scenario where Republicans, especially in the House trot out the familiar cries of “amnesty” and block any action involving a path to citizenship. And, she says, it’s not hard to imagine Democrats, unwilling to accept anything less than full citizenship, walk away and tell Latino voters that they tried, but the GOP blocked them.¶ The question, she says, comes down to whether politicians want to make a "deal," or whether they want to make an "issue." And given the current track record, a deal on immigration might be less inevitable than it seems.¶ Beyond the controversial issues that threaten to derail a deal—border security and the debate over legal status—Jacoby says the more important piece to comprehensive immigration reform is setting up a system to deal with immigrants of the future.¶ The fact is, she says, that most immigrants would like to come here legally and most employers would like to higher workers legally, and that a lot of them can’t find Americans to take the less-skilled positions they need to fill. What she proposes, and has written in detail about here, is a smarter worker visa program. The program she envisions would allow businesses provided they prove that they could not find an American citizen to fill the position and offer a fair wage, to hire a certain number of foreign workers every year. The caps on the number of worker visas issued would fluctuate with demand, rather than be set at a static, arbitrary number.¶ Jacoby presents the idea as better: for workers, who gain rights and better wages; for businesses, who get the labor they need to contribute to economic growth: and for the government, which would get some much-needed relief at the border.¶ But like other components of reform, this, too, gets controversial when discussing details. Similar to attempts to push this kind of program in years past have been blocked by what she characterizes as “an unholy alliance of labor-friendly Democrats and anti-immigrant Republicans” that don’t like the idea of more worker visas—and these groups are still around to act as spoilers.¶ For now, she says, there essentially remain two signs at the border: KEEP OUT and HELP WANTED. Whether that de facto policy changes is still up to those negotiating deals in Congress.¶ There is momentum. But is there momentum to get it right?

#### CIR is DOA – Shutdown Drained His PC and Increased Congressional Partisanship

By Amie Parnes 10/18/13 05:30 AM ET Obama’s hollow debt victory http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/329219-obamas-hollow-debt-victory#ixzz2i5oBnwAU

President Obama’s victory over congressional Republicans is likely to have a short shelf life.¶ Even the president’s staunchest allies are skeptical that his triumph in the debt-ceiling battle has produced much capital for the White House to spend on priorities like immigration reform. ¶ “I don’t know that this changes anything,” one former senior administration official said. “I don’t think the president has new mojo from this.”¶ “What did they really do? They brought the country to the same place where we were a few weeks ago,” the former official said. “This isn’t like he passed healthcare. He ended a government shutdown and raised the debt limit. Those are routine items. It’s not like he campaigned on it.”¶ Obama took his second victory lap in two days Thursday on the heels of the bipartisan deal, chiding congressional Republicans for engaging in political brinksmanship with the economy on the day the government reopened after a 16-day shutdown.¶ He also blamed the GOP — as he has in recent days — for bringing the nation dangerously close to defaulting on the debt limit. ¶ “You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president, then argue for your position,” Obama said in the State Dining Room at the White House. “Go out there and win an election.”¶ “Push to change it,” the president said. “But don’t break it.”¶ While he rallied White House allies with the sentiment, he also angered Republicans, who felt it was a sucker punch.**¶** “The president’s admonishment ignores his own shortcomings,” said one senior Republican adviser working on Capitol Hill. “The fact is, he shares equal blame for the shutdown. It’s not as if the stalemate was created overnight. The shutdown is fallout from Obama’s lack of outreach and his ineffective approach to being a leader.”¶ The GOP adviser — who acknowledged defeat in the fight — said Obama’s admonition was “entirely void of the substance of the debate and designed to demonize legitimate opposition.¶ “[It] totally ignored was the president’s own past opposition to raising the debt ceiling and the months leading to this episode when the White House could have been working with Congress to avoid such a crisis,” the adviser said.¶ Republican strategist Ron Bonjean said he didn’t expect relations between Obama and Republicans to improve.¶ “No one has political capital at this point to really accomplish major legislative initiatives by the end of this year,” Bonjean said. “It’s highly unlikely that any comprehensive immigration reform bill would be able to move through the House after such a bruising fight over the shutdown and the debt ceiling.”

#### Budget is the top priority and CIR doesn’t pass

Jalonick, 10-17 – writer for Associated Press (Mary, 10-17, “Obama: Focus on Budget, Immigration, Farm Bill” http://www.kristv.com/news/obama-focus-on-budget-immigration-farm-bill/)djm

WASHINGTON (AP) - The government shutdown behind him, President Barack Obama focused Thursday on a new, trimmed down agenda by challenging Congress to overcome bitter partisan division and pass a budget and a farm bill and overhaul immigration. The president said getting through those three priorities would help Washington move beyond "the cloud of crisis" created by the 16-day partial shuttering of government operations. But he acknowledge the political reality that even passing such a slimmed-down agenda by the end of the year will be tough. "To all my friends in Congress, understand that how business is done in this town has to change because we've all got a lot of work to do on behalf of the American people, and that includes the hard work of regaining their trust," Obama said from the White House, the morning after signing a painfully forged bipartisan deal to reopen the government and avert a default. Obama has slashed his wish list from earlier this year, when he called for legislation to address climate change, an increase in the minimum wage, gun control and the closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison. The reduced priorities underscore how difficult it has been to get legislation through Congress, the short legislative calendar left this year and Obama's limited political capital. Prospects for passage of an immigration bill appear particularly dim. A bill passed by the Democratic-controlled Senate and backed by the White House includes billions for border security and a path to citizenship for those already living in the U.S. illegally, but most House Republicans have rejected the approach. Likewise, the roughly $500 billion farm bill has been held up over a dispute between the two chambers, this time over food stamps. The House has endorsed up to $4 billion in annual cuts to the almost $80 billion-a-year Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, while the Senate farm bill would cut only $400 million a year. The White House has threatened to veto the House bill. Obama did not mention the rift over food stamps but said the House should accept the Senate version of the bill. "Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done," Obama said. The president said the first focus should be on reaching a budget agreement that lowers deficits, invests in education and infrastructure, cuts spending and closes corporate loopholes. Congressional negotiators were starting to discuss that issue Thursday.

#### Obama announced the plan

Feldman 8/9/13 – (Elliot, “United States: TPP, TTIP, And Congress: The Elephant In The Room”, Mondaq, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/257058/international+trade+investment/TPP+TTIP+And+Congress+The+Elephant+In+The+Room)

The Washington trade policy community is buzzing over the two largest international trade negotiations since the effective collapse of the Doha multilateral trade round. The buzz may be even louder in foreign capitals. The Obama Administration, in mid-July, was still promising to complete the Trans Pacific Partnership ("TPP") negotiations by year-end, while starting up the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") negotiations with similar speedy objectives. For both deals there is engagement and enthusiasm. Inside U.S. Trade, the trade community's weekly Bible, devoted over thirty pages, all but one article in a recent edition, to these negotiations.

#### No link – trade doesn’t face opposition

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate.

#### The plan is bipartisan- no backlash and different from other trade agreements

Schott and Cimino 13- Jeffrey J. is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, joined the Institute in 1983. Cathleen Cimino has been research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since 2012

To be sure, disagreements over these issues have confounded transatlantic officials for almost two decades. One of the reasons for past failures has been that negotiators tried to break down barriers in a piecemeal fashion. Attempts to achieve limited “mutual recognition” deals on specific products or sectors foundered because of strong resistance from independent regulatory agencies pressing their own agendas in response to political pressures. Trying to reach a more comprehensive deal offers the oportunity to garner sufficient political support to off set those political obstacles. Indeed, Max Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, emphasized this point in a recent Financial Times op-ed, noting that “any bilateral trade and investment agreement must be comprehensive and address the full range of barriers to US goods and services if it is to receive broad, bipartisan congressional support.” 4 One way to avoid past mistakes and indeed to overcome the understandable skepticism of many would be for the two sides to learn from the success of several recent comprehensive bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)—most notably the accords that the European Union and the United States each have with South Korea. These two agreements successfully liberalized trade and investment in goods and services in a manner that shows a path to success for the TTIP, which as we discuss below, is essentially what the HLWG has recommended. If the United States and the European Union follow this path, they could achieve a transatlantic accord in the next few years that both contributes to stronger economic growth and establishes a 21st century rulebook for trade that can provide a benchmark for new regional and multilateral trade agreements.

#### Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key – winners win

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On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

#### Mexican instability spills over to the US, sparking civil war.

Steven **David 99**, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, January/February, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis

CONFLICTS FOUGHT within the borders of a single state send shock waves far beyond their frontiers. To begin with, internal wars risk destroying assets the United States needs. Were the Persian Gulf oil fields destroyed in a Saudi civil war, the American economy (and those of the rest of the developed world) would suffer severely. Internal wars can also unleash threats that stable governments formerly held in check. As central governments weaken and fall, weapons of mass destruction may fall into the hands of rogue leaders or anti-American factions. More directly, internal wars endanger American citizens living and traveling abroad. Liberia will not be the last place America sends helicopters to rescue its stranded citizens. Finally, internal wars, when they erupt on U.S. borders, threaten to destabilize America itself. U.S. intervention in Haiti was spurred, in large part, by fear of the flood of refugees poised to enter the United States. All of these dangers are grave enough to warrant consideration; what makes them even more serious is the fact that their impact on America is largely unintended. Being unintended, the spill-off effects of civil wars are not easily deterred, which creates unique challenges to American interests. U.S. policymakers have traditionally tried to sway foreign leaders through a simple formula: ensure that the benefits of defying America are outweighed by the punishment that the United States will inflict if defied. That calculus, however, no longer applies when there is no single, rational government in place to deter. This raises the cost to America; if the United States (or any country) cannot deter a threat, it must turn to actual self-defense or preemption instead. Unlike deterrence, these strategies are enormously difficult to carry out and in some cases (such as preventing the destruction of the Saudi oil fields) would be impossible. Without deterrence as a policy option, Washington loses its most effective means of safeguarding its interests. Where are these new threats likely to crop up? And which should the United States be concerned with? Two criteria must guide policymakers in answering these questions. First is the actual likelihood of civil war in any particular state. American interests would be endangered by a war in Canada, but the prospect is so improbable it can safely be ignored. Second is the impact of a civil war on the United States; would it threaten vital American security and economic concerns? Future conflict in Sierra Leone may be plausible, but it would have such a negligible impact on the United States that it does not justify much attention. Only three countries, in fact, meet both criteria: Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Civil conflict in Mexico would produce waves of disorder that would spill into the United States, endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans, destroying a valuable export market, and sending a torrent of refugees northward. A rebe8llion in Saudi Arabia could destroy its ability to export oil, the oil on which the industrialized world depends. And internal war in Russia could devastate Europe and trigger the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, civil war in a cluster of other states could seriously harm American interests. These countries include Indonesia, Venezuela, the Philippines, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and China. In none, however, are the stakes as high or the threat of war as imminent. BREAKING MEXICO'S HABIT MEXICO TODAY faces a future more uncertain than at any other point in its modern history. Pervasive corruption financed by drug traffickers, the end of one-party rule, armed revolt, and economic disaster have all surfaced over the past few years. In response, the Mexican army has begun to question its decades-old record of non-interference in politics. Should Mexico collapse into chaos, even for a short period of time, vital American interests will be endangered. This, in turn, raises the specter of U.S. intervention. The growing influence of drug money is the greatest single source of Mexican instability. The narcotics industry has worked its way into the fabric of Mexican society, to the extent that it is now Mexico's largest hard currency source (estimated at $ 30 billion per year) and is probably the country's largest employer. As in Colombia, drug dealers threaten to take control of the state. More worrying, senior Mexican officials -- including those in charge of the antidrug effort -- are routinely found to be working for drug cartels. Major drug traffickers have assembled their own private armies and operate without fear of prosecution. Crime, much of it drug financed, runs rampant throughout the country, particularly in Mexico City. In 1995, then-CIA director John Deutch signaled his concern for the impact of drugs on Mexico by making that country a strategic intelligence priority for the first time. It may, however, already be too late for help from Washington. The control of Mexico by drug traffickers will be hard to reverse, especially since, given the central role the drug lords play in Mexican life, doing so might further destabilize the country. The Mexican economy provides a second source of civil conflict. The country still has not recovered from its 1994 economic crisis, when the devaluation of the peso sparked fear of total financial collapse. Disaster was averted by the extraordinary intervention of the United States and the International Monetary Fund, which provided a $ 50 billion bailout. Despite this assistance, inflation climbed to 52 percent (up from 7 percent the year before), real earnings dropped by as much as 12 percent, the GDP shrank 6 percent, and over 25 percent of Mexicans fell seriously behind in debt repayment. Though conditions have improved slightly in the years since, the basic problems that caused the devaluation in the first place remain -- such as reliance on foreign investment to finance growth. These problems, combined with crushing Mexican poverty (85 percent of Mexicans are either unemployed or not earning a living wage), falling oil prices, and the widening gap between the prosperous north and the impoverished south, together form the basis for future unrest. Ironically, the advent of true democracy has further threatened Mexican stability. For 70 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party ruled the nominally democratic country as a private fiefdom. The PRI made all key decisions and chose all important officials (including the president) while suppressing meaningful dissent. The monopoly ended in 1997, however, when the PRI lost its majority in the lower house of parliament to two competing political parties. The Conservative Party (PAN) now threatens the PRI in the more prosperous north while the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) has gained support among poor southerners, students, and intellectuals, and has won the key post of mayor of Mexico City. The fall of the PRI may enhance stability in the long term, as oppressed groups see their demands addressed for the first time. But the transition itself will be dangerous; states in the process of democratizing are far more vulnerable to civil conflict than are mature democracies or authoritarian regimes. As opposition parties declare their intent to expose the PRI's corrupt and criminal history, the order which Mexico has enjoyed for 70 years will be the first casualty of the new freedom. As if to illustrate the potential for disorder, major armed uprisings have once again erupted. Mexico has suffered a long tradition of regional warfare, dating back to its earliest days of independence. After decades of peace, this threat reemerged in the mid-1990s, and now endangers the stability of the state. In January 1994, some 4,000 "Zapatista" rebels, fearful of losing their land, seized seven towns in the southern state of Chiapas. Though they were poorly armed, the support they received throughout Mexico and the army's inability to quell their revolt starkly demonstrated the weakness of the Mexican government. That weakness grew even more pronounced when it was revealed that the government had turned to paramilitary groups to suppress the rebels. One such group massacred 45 civilians in December 1997, sparking widespread protest and investigations of government complicity. Meanwhile, the less well known but potentially more dangerous People's Revolutionary Army (EPR) launched a rebellion in 1996 by attacking military and economic targets in six southern states. Unlike the Zapatistas, the EPR openly seeks to overthrow the current regime. While its prospects of doing so may be remote, the EPR's very existence drives a thorn into the government's side. Amidst these struggles, the Mexican military may abandon its long tradition of noninvolvement in politics. Since the 1980s, the government has called on the military to suppress drug-related violence within the country. This use of the military for domestic purposes drew it directly into political disputes it had shied from in the past, and risked spreading corruption within the ranks. Meanwhile, the end of the PRI's monopoly on power may further destabilize the armed forces. For the first time in their history, the troops face an institutionally divided leadership. The military might split into rival political factions, especially if opposition parties are prevented from exercising power. Conflict in Mexico threatens a wide range of core American interests. A civil war would endanger the 350,000 Americans live south of the border who. Direct American investments of at least $ 50 billion would be threatened, as would $ 156 billion in bilateral trade and a major source of petroleum exports. Illegal immigrants would swarm across the 2,000-mile frontier, fleeing civil conflict. And armed incursions might follow; during the Mexican Revolution of 1910, fighting spilled over the border often enough that the United States had to deploy roughly half its armed forces to contain the conflict. In a future war, the millions of Americans with family in Mexico might take sides in the fighting, sparking violence within the United States.

#### Extinction

James **Pinkerton 03**, fellow at the New America Foundation, , Freedom and Survival, p. http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2003/freedom\_and\_survival

Historically, the only way that the slow bureaucratic creep of government is reversed is through revolution or war. And that could happen. But there's a problem: the next American revolution won't be fought with muskets. It could well be waged with proliferated wonder-weapons. That is, about the time that American yeopersons decide to resist the encroachment of the United Nations, or the European Union—or the United States government—the level of destructive power in a future conflict could remove the choice expressed by Patrick Henry in his ringing cry, "Give me liberty, or give me death." The next big war could kill everybody, free and unfree alike.

#### Obama can’t influence Congress

Koffler 10/11

Keith Koffler, who covered the White House as a reporter for CongressDaily and Roll Call

Obama’s crisis of credibility

By: Keith Koffler

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http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=CFCD7934-C4A3-4CCC-8261-9038B7E1D759

President Barack Obama is like a novice flier thrust into the cockpit of a 747. He’s pushing buttons, flipping switches and radioing air traffic control, but nothing’s happening. The plane is just slowly descending on its own, and while it may or may not crash, it at least doesn’t appear to be headed to any particularly useful destination.¶ Obama’s ineffectiveness, always a hallmark of his presidency, has reached a new cruising altitude this year. Not even a year into his second term, he looks like a lame duck and quacks like a lame duck. You guessed it — he’s a lame duck.¶ On the world stage, despite Obama’s exertions, Iran’s centrifuges are still spinning, the Israelis and Palestinians remain far apart, Bashar Assad is still in power, the Taliban are gaining strength and Iraq is gripped by renewed violence.¶ At home, none of Obama’s agenda has passed this year. Republicans aren’t bowing to him in the battle of the budget, and much of the GOP seems uninterested in House Speaker John Boehner’s vision of some new grand bargain with the president.Obama has something worse on his hands than being hated. All presidents get hated. But Obama is being ignored. And that’s because he has no credibility. A president enters office having earned a certain stock of political capital just for getting elected. He then spends it down, moving his agenda forward, until he collects a fresh supply by getting reelected. But political capital is only the intangible substrate that gives a president his might. His presidency must also be nourished by credibility — a sense he can be trusted, relied upon and feared — to make things happen. A president enters office with a measure of credibility. After all, he seemed at least trustworthy enough to get elected. But unlike political capital, credibility must be built in office. Otherwise, it is squandered. Obama has used every credibility-busting method available to eviscerate any sense that he can be counted on. He’s dissimulated, proven his unreliability, ruled arbitrarily and turned the White House into a Chicago-style political boiler room. His credibility has been sapped with his political opponents, a public that thinks him incompetent, our allies, who don’t trust him, and, even worse, our enemies, who don’t fear him.

## 1ar

### 1ar – apoc

#### Securitization doesn’t result in war except when heg isn’t there to check it.

Gartzke 12—Erik Gartzke, University of California, San Diego, Could climate change precipitate peace?, Journal of Peace Research 49(1) 177–192, http://www.openbriefing.org/docs/JPRclimateconflict.pdf

Violent conflict occurs wherever human beings inhabit the globe. Disputes require some mechanism for resolution, whether this involves force or persuasion. When the stakes are high, the temptation to resort to violence as the final arbiter must remain strong. State monopolies on force do not refute, but instead reflect the logic of political competition. Of course, the fact that politics involves violence does not make all politics violent. The possibility of punishment or coercion is itself available to deter or compel, and therefore often prevents the exercise of force. Common conjecture about the eventuality of conflict ‘shadows’ political discourse, often making behavioral violence redundant. Political actors can anticipate when another actor is incentivized to violence and can choose to avoid provocation (Leeds & Davis, 1997). Alternately, ignorance, indifference or an inability to act can result in political violence. Scholars must thus view context, motive, and information to determine whether certain situations make force more or less likely.

### 1ar – politics

#### Shutdown Concessions Strengthened GOP Gridlock – Obama Gained Zero Momentum From the Win

By Tim Stanley US Historian 10/16 October 16th, 2013 US debt ceiling crisis – Barack Obama has won the shutdown. His prize is a lame duck presidency http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/timstanley/100241757/us-debt-ceiling-crisis-barack-obama-has-won-the-shutdown-his-prize-is-a-lame-duck-presidency/

Second, what has Obama really won? He keeps his precious healthcare reform and he gets government open again – but tomorrow morning he will still have the same gridlocked political system that he had the night before. The shutdown is a rare example of him winning, but remember that this lame duck president has not only had a very simple (and, frankly, inoffensive) gun control bill killed in the Senate but was so spooked by bad poll numbers that he tried to dump responsibility for military action in Syria onto the Congress – before quietly dropping the idea altogether. Any thought that the shutdown payoff will be that he can sail an immigration reform package comfortably through Congress is pure fantasy.

This is a broken presidency living out its last few years either holding off Republican attacks or lazily cruising the country on some pointless, endless, fatuous campaign trail. Obama's administration is politically bankrupt.¶ The talk for the next week will be about how the Tea Party is dead and Republicans must elect a politically correct, middle-of-the-road, unimaginative, establishment, compromising candidate in 2016 (preferably a singing sloth, cos the polls show that Americans just love those). But the reality is that US politics right now is a mess for both Left and Right, and the country is stuck in partisan limbo until the 2014 midterms or even the 2016 presidential election. This is not a Republican problem, it is an American problem.

#### Won’t pass—House is dysfunctional

Fabian, 10/16/13(“The House Can't Handle Immigration Reform [Analysis]”, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC\_Univision/house-handle-immigration-reform-analysis/story?id=20587483)//Holmes

President Obama says he’s ready to renew the push for immigration reform immediately after the fiscal crises plaguing Washington end. We’re not convinced that’s a fight he can win. Obama told Univision’s Los Angeles affiliate KMEX Tuesday that once the government is re-opened and the debt ceiling is lifted, “the day after I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform.” And immigration-reform activists are reportedly drawing up plans to marshal an immigration bill through the House of Representatives, hoping that Republicans who control the lower chamber be willing to come back to the table after a bruising fiscal battle. But if the debt-ceiling and shutdown fights taught us anything, it’s that the House of Representatives is extremely fractured. It’s a body that seems incapable of handling a bill that requires compromise to pass.

#### Ideological interests outweigh political capital

Drezner, 13 – is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a senior editor at The National Interest (Daniel, 10-2, “American Politics 101, R.I.P.”http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/02/american\_politics\_101\_rip)djm

The U.S. federal government continues to stay shut down, and analysts are beginning to realize that the current crisis will soon ensnare the debt-ceiling vote that must take place by Oct. 17. This is prompting a geyser of political analysis to explain why a legislature with a 10 percent approval rating has reached a position where the outcome is a gambit opposed by an overwhelming majority of Americans. As a political scientist, I'd humbly suggest that that standard Political Science 101 models are now pretty much bunk. The bread and butter of American politics is pluralism. Members of Congress want to get elected and re-elected. The way they do that is by pleasing their constituents. Traditionally, the way they did that was by pursuing a mix of policies that pleased the kind of organized, concentrated interests that bothered to go and vote. These policies usually included a slice of pork-barrel politics designed to target groups with a material stake in their representatives, and some symbolic politics designed to target groups with an ideological stake in their representatives. The funny thing is that this time around, the material interests on the GOP side appear to have zero influence over their party, as the Washington Post's Zachary Goldfarb reports: The decision to shut down the government because Democrats would not make major changes to President Obama’s health-care law underscored the fading influence of traditional business interests in the Republican Party — and the rising influence of more confrontational and conservative tea party groups that encouraged Republicans to embrace the shutdown strategy. “While I don’t think the Affordable Care Act is in the best interest of the country, I also don’t think it is in the best interest of the country to shut the government down,” said Harold L. Jackson, executive chairman of Buffalo Supply, a Colorado medical equipment company.… The experience of the Chamber of Commerce, one of Washington’s most powerful lobbying groups, may best illustrate the new tensions between Republicans and the business community. The chamber spent more than $60 million in 2010 and 2012, helping elect tea party Republicans and winning GOP control of the House. But while there have been signs of fraying in the relationship for several years, the GOP’s willingness to defy its strongest business supporters became clearest Tuesday with the shutdown. The Chamber had led more than a hundred business groups in urging Congress to keep the government open. “With the U.S. economy continuing to underperform, the federal government needs to maintain its normal operations,” a Chamber-sponsored letter said Monday, hours before the shutdown. “It is not in the best interest of the employers, employees or the American people to risk a government shutdown that will be economically disruptive and create even more uncertainties for the U.S. economy.” A Chamber spokeswoman played down the differences between Republicans and the trade group, saying businesses don’t back candidates based on a single issue. But other conservative groups were happy to highlight the new wedge dividing the Chamber and the GOP. So it would seem that groups like the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable have waning influence over GOP House members. In part, however, this also reflects the fact that those GOP House members have less that they can offer these interest groups. In an interview with Ezra Klein, National Review's outstanding congressional reporter Robert Costa explained a key dynamic within the House GOP caucus: What we're seeing is the collapse of institutional Republican power. It’s not so much about Boehner. It’s things like the end of earmarks. They move away from Tom DeLay and they think they're improving the House, but now they have nothing to offer their members. The outside groups don't always move votes directly but they create an atmosphere of fear among the members. And so many of these members now live in the conservative world of talk radio and tea party conventions and Fox News invitations. And so the conservative strategy of the moment, no matter how unrealistic it might be, catches fire. The members begin to believe they can achieve things in divided government that most objective observers would believe is impossible. Leaders are dealing with these expectations that wouldn't exist in a normal environment. Mark Schmitt makes a similar point in the New Republic: [T]he modern Republican Party is not strong. It’s something more like a loose association of independent forces, including Tea Party–backed members, those with their own sources of campaign money from ideological backers, many with seats so safe that they can happily ignore all their non-conservative constituents, and outside agents like Heritage Foundation President Jim DeMint, who BusinessWeek recently described as the de facto Speaker of the House. Many of its politicians have deliberately cut themselves off from all the incentives that traditionally moderate and stabilize politics—earmarks, constituent service (many offices say they won’t help constituents maneuver the ACA), and infrastructure spending. With safe seats, and hearing little dissent at home, they are able to do so. Cutting themselves off from the incentive to build and maintain a strong and viable party is part of the same story. What's remarkable is how quickly this transformation of the GOP has been. A decade ago, we were reading about ambitious initiatives like the "K Street Project," designed to ensure that powerful material interest groups strengthened ties with the Republican Party. Now it's the ideological interests that are ascendant -- and this poses enormous challenges to the American body politic. The thing about standard interest-group politics is that bargains could be struck. Any member of Congress or interest group that didn't like the contours of a deal could be assuaged with a tax loophole here or a public works project there. Now, taken to its extreme, this leads to an incredibly corrupt system of government. At a low level, however, this kind of corruption is the grease that allows governments to do things like pass budgets and honor its debts. Ideological interest groups are much harder to buy off, however. Their reason for existence is to push their ideas, and most of them will not accept half-measures. This leads to a situation where they benefit more from deadlock than from a bargain. Which is great for the Club for Growth … and lousy for the rest of the country. The fact that this transformation of the GOP's internal organization took place in under a decade suggests that it could also reverse course just as quickly. That said, it's becoming harder and harder to talk about what's happening in Washington as "politics as usual." Because the dynamics of American politics now look very different than they did even a decade ago.